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This paper focuses on determining a fair sanction for misconduct. This will be 
considered within the context of our common law and legislative provisions. 
Emphasis will be placed on the requirements for determining a fair sanction for 
misconduct and the assessment mechanisms that commissioners utilise in 
adjudicating the fairness of the sanctions imposed by employers. In determining 
a fair sanction for misconduct an analysis will be made of all the relevant factors 
that need to be taken into consideration when making a determination in respect 
to sanction. This paper will also consider two specific examples of misconduct, 
namely dishonesty and negligence, and the sanctions that the courts deem most 
appropriate for such workplace misconduct. This paper will then consider factors 
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This dissertation will attempt to unravel the mystery around determining a fair 
sanction for misconduct. This will be considered within our legislative and legal 
framework from the perspective of both employers and arbitrators who adjudicate 
on the fairness of dismissals as well as other disciplinary action short of 
dismissal.1 An analysis will also be made of termination of employment under the 
common law and terminations in terms of our statutory dispensation and the 
need now for fairness as opposed to mere lawfulness. Thereafter, considerable 
focus will be given to the migration from the reasonable employer test to the 
reasonable commissioner test in determining a fair sanction for misconduct.2 This 
is per the Constitutional Court decision in Sidumo v Rustenberg Platinum Mines 
Ltd.3 This paper will also focus on factors that may mitigate or aggravate sanction 
and will consider how much relevance they have in determining a fair sanction for 
misconduct. A comparison will be made between intentional and negligent acts of 
misconduct and determining a fair sanction for such acts of misconduct. 
However, this paper will not consider collective acts of misconduct and the 
determination of a fair sanction for such collective transgressions. 
 
1.2 Aims and objective 
 
The primary objective of this paper is to consider our legal position in so far as 
the determination of a fair sanction for misconduct is concerned and whether our 
jurisprudence adequately assists employers and arbitrators in making that 
determination. Although all disciplinary action must be procedurally and 
substantively fair, the most contentious issue is establishing when it is fair to 
                                                 
1 Sections 185 to 188 of the LRA 
2 Country Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others (1999) 20 ILJ 1701 (LAC), Sidumo v Rustenberg Platinum Mines Ltd 
& others (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) 
3 Ibid; reference to the Sidumo decision in this paper will be that of the Constitutional Court unless it is specifically 
stated that reference is being made to the decisions of the courts a quo (this includes the footnotes) 
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dismiss. Section 188(2) of the Labour Relations Act4 (hereinafter referred to as 
the LRA) enjoins any person considering the fairness of a dismissal to take 
cognisance of any code of good practice issued in terms of the Act.5 Item 7(b)(iv) 
of Schedule 8, Code of Good Practice: Dismissal (hereinafter referred to as the 
Code) states that dismissal must be an appropriate sanction for breach of the 
rule or standard.6 But over and above this, employers and arbitrators must also 
have due regard for the contract of employment, judicial precedent, collective 
agreements and other codes as well as the severity of the misconduct, nature of 
the job and the personal circumstances of the employee who transgressed.  
 
1.3 Research question / issue 
 
This paper will attempt to unpack all the factors that need to be taken into 
account in order to determine a fair sanction for misconduct, with particular focus 
on when it will be fair or appropriate to dismiss an employee who has 
transgressed and whether these principles adequately guide and assist 
employers and arbitrators in making such determination.  
 
1.4 Research methodology 
 
The research methodology for this paper is desk based research. Articles, case 
law, books and journals that provide insight into the topic of determining a fair 
sanction for misconduct have been consulted. The material has been considered 
within the parameters of our Constitutional and legislative framework and with 





                                                 
4 Act 66 of 1995 
5 Schedule 8, the Code of Good: Practice: Dismissal 
6 The other provisions relating to substantive fairness, namely Items 7(b)(i) to (iii) will not be considered in this paper 
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1.5 Structure of dissertation 
 
Chapter one is an introduction to the topic of determining a fair sanction for 
misconduct whilst chapter two deals with the background issues as well as the  
common law and legislative position in so far as determining a fair sanction for 
misconduct is concerned. Chapter three focuses on the actual determination of a 
fair sanction for misconduct and the role of the reasonable commissioner test in 
so far as it relates to the adjudication of the fairness of a dismissal. Chapter four 
considers the relevant factors that need to be taken into account when 
determining a fair sanction for misconduct. Chapter five deals with dismissal 
disputes and chapter six provides concluding comments in respect of this topic. 
 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Common Law and the employment relationship 
 
Once the employment relationship is established, it is regulated by the common 
law, legislation, the contract of employment and collective agreements. The 
dismissal of employees is regulated by the LRA.7 In terms of the LRA, dismissal 
must be both procedurally and substantively fair. Substantive fairness entails, 
inter alia, that the sanction imposed for misconduct must be fair.  
 
Notwithstanding statutory intervention, the common law contract of employment 
still remains relevant in modern day society and is an integral part of our labour 
law jurisprudence.8  It is still founded on the ‘master and servant’ relationship of 
the common law.9 The contract of employment is the founding act of the 
employment relationship which is thereafter regulated by way of legislation and 
collective agreement.10 The relationship is reciprocal in which both parties have 
                                                 
7 J Grogan Dismissal (2010)  1 
8 Rycroft…et al. A Guide to South African Labour Law 2nd ed. (1992) 44 
9 Ibid 
10 J Grogan Workplace Law 10th ed (2009) 47 
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duties and responsibilities.11 The employees’ duties, amongst others, are to be 
respectful and obedient and to refrain from misconduct in general, as this 
undermines confidence and trust.12 It is trite that trust is the pillar of the 
employment relationship and the breach of this duty generally renders the 
employment relationship intolerable and thereby justifies dismissal.  However, it 
is important to take cognisance of the fact that the common law of employment is 
being developed to bring it in line with the Constitution.13  
 
In terms of the contract, a breach by either party entitles the other to accept the 
breach and sue for damages, or to reject the breach and sue for specific 
performance. However, under the LRA an employer’s acceptance of an 
employee’s repudiation and cancellation of the contract constitutes a dismissal.14 
The common law provides no security of employment and the employer is free to 
terminate the contract at any stage with no reason or even an unfair reason as 
long as the required notice period is given. There is no requirement of a fair 
reason for termination of the contract. At common law the court will not interfere 
because the dismissal was unfair.15 The intention of the LRA is to provide 
employees with additional remedies where their employment agreements have 
been terminated, it does not however preclude employees from still enforcing 
common law rights.16 Further, the Code is not the exclusive domain of 
employees’ rights and remedies.17 Section 185 of the LRA also does not 
impliedly create a contractual right to fairness in a contract of employment.18 In 
this regard, where the LRA adequately gives effect to constitutional rights there is 
no need for the common law to be developed so as to duplicate these rights.19 It 
is self evident that terminations under the common law are concerned with 
                                                 
11 Ibid 
12 Ibid 51 & 52 
13 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Ibid 2 
14 J Grogan Workplace Law 10th ed (2009) 45 
15 Ibid 3 and footnote 6 
16 Ibid 
17 Ibid 
18 SAMSA v McKenzie [2010] 5 BLLR 488 (SCA) 
19 Ibid 
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lawfulness whilst terminations under the LRA are concerned with fairness. The 
word ‘dismissal’ is foreign to the common law.20 In terms of the LRA, a 
termination that complies with the required notice period in terms of the contract 
of employment or legislation governing employment, still constitutes a 





The erstwhile courts established under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956, first 
traversed the equity based approach to dismissal.22 This was done through the 
legislative creation of an ‘unfair labour practice’ which allowed the labour courts 
to move beyond the confines of the law of contract that focused on lawfulness 
into the uncertain sphere of fairness.23  The question in dismissal disputes was 
not whether the employer was contractually entitled to terminate the contract but 
whether it acted fairly in doing so.24  Under the common law, the contract of 
employment could be terminated by mutual consent or by either party giving the 
requisite notice of termination.25 This effectively meant that the employer could 
dismiss at will and an employee’s claim was limited to the payment of damages 
for any outstanding notice pay.26 The labour tribunal established in terms of the 
1956 Act, developed the concepts of procedural and substantive fairness in so 
far as dismissal disputes were concerned, which was foreign under the common 
law.27 The concept of an ‘unfair labour practice’ and the courts power to 
adjudicate the fairness of a dismissal revolutionised our labour law.28 The right 
now not to be unfairly dismissed or subjected to an ‘unfair labour practice’ now 
                                                 
20 J Grogan Dismissal (2010)  2 
21 Section 186(a) and Item 2(1) of the LRA 




26Ibid; notice pay – in the amount that the employee would have earned had he or she worked his or her notice period 
27J Grogan Dismissal (2010)  3 
28 Ibid 
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forms part of our law under the current LRA.29 The intention of the requirement of 
a fair sanction or fair dismissal was not intended to protect hoodlum employees 
or frustrate employers, but was seen as a necessary antidote to the employers’ 
right to dismiss. It is there to ensure that employees can work in a conducive 
environment without fear of unjust treatment and for employees to be able to 
freely exercise their rights.30  
 
The need for discipline in the workplace is not only related to productivity and 
efficiency requirements. It is also derived from the employers’ common law and 
statutory requirements to ensure a healthy and safe working environment. The 
need for discipline is also reinforced by the application of the common law 
doctrine of vicarious liability wherein the employer is held responsible for damage 
caused by an employee within the course and scope of employment.31 The 
employer’s right to discipline emanates from the contract of employment. The 
employee when entering into a contract of employment, places his or her 
capacity to work at the disposal of the employer. It is for the employer to decide 
how the capacity to work is utilised within the parameters of the law. Therefore, 
the employer’s power to control the manner in which the employee behaves both 
in and outside the workplace is a distinctive feature of the contract of 
employment.32 When an employee breaches rules or standards, the employer is 
entitled to discipline an employee. This includes transgressions that are 
committed outside the workplace or outside working hours as long as the 
conduct in question somehow relates to or impacts on the working relationship or 
image of the organisation. However, managing the conduct of employees in a fair 
and positive manner can lead to a harmonious and productive workforce.33 
 
It is self evident that the common law and law of contract on their own provide no 
assistance in ensuring that terminations are fair or that fair sanctions are 
                                                 
29 Section 185 of the LRA; J Grogan Dismissal (2010)  3 
30 J Grogan Dismissal (2010)  3 
31 http://www.irnetwork.co.za/nxt/gateway.dll/tehj/tnzm/lv5m?f=templates$fn=document 
32 Ibid 
33 J Grogan Workplace Law 10th ed (2009) 159 
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imposed. The focus is on lawfulness and adherence to contractual provisions in 
the contract of employment itself. Through the unfair labour practice provisions 
under the erstwhile 1956 LRA the courts introduced the requirements of equity 
based dismissals and the right not to be unfairly dismissed or subjected to unfair 
labour practices has now been codified in our present LRA.34 The courts have 
however acknowledged that the contract of employment impliedly imposes on 
employers a duty of ‘fair dealing with their employees’.35 However, the courts 
have made it clear that section 185 of the LRA does not impliedly create a 
contractual right to fairness in a contract of employment.36 Although employees 
retain their common law rights, they cannot sue in terms of the common law or 
contract of employment for an unfair dismissal. Their claim must be based on 
unlawful termination of the contract. As the court stated – where the LRA 
adequately protects constitutional rights there is no need to develop the common 
law so as to duplicate these rights.37  
 
2.3 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that ‘everyone 
has the right to fair labour practices’.38 This is a fundamental right that has been 
given effect through legislative enactment. The LRA provides that every 
employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed or subjected to unfair labour 




2.4 The right not to be unfairly dismissed and subjected to unfair labour practices 
 
                                                 
34 Section 185 of the LRA 
35 Murray v Minister of Defence, supra 
36 SAMSA v McKenzie, supra 
37 Ibid 
38 Section 23 of the LRA 
39 Section 185 of the LRA 
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 As stated above, the right not to be unfairly dismissed is now codified in the LRA 
(section 185), and the relevant Codes of Good Practice in terms of section 138(6) 
of the LRA. The relevant codes are Schedule 8, The Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissals and the CCMA Guidelines for Commissioners for Dismissal 
Arbitrations. Section 185(b) of the LRA also states that every employee has the 
right not to be subjected to unfair labour practices. Section 186 of the LRA 
defines dismissals and unfair labour practices. It is also interesting to note in 
terms of section 186(2)(b) of the LRA, that any unfair disciplinary action short of 
dismissal (such as a warning, for example) can amount to an unfair labour 
practice. But the operative word for unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices 
is unfairness itself, which needs to be established.  In the workplace, dismissal is 
generally justified if an employee has breached a material term of the contract of 
employment or his or her conduct has rendered the continued employment 
relationship intolerable.40 Misconduct occurs where an employee breaches rules 
that exist within a workplace. These rules may emanate from the express or 
implied terms of the contract, from the disciplinary code and procedure applicable 
in the workplace or from general standards and practices that are accepted as 
applicable in the particular workplace.41  
 
2.5 Types of Dismissals 
 
 The LRA recognises many forms of dismissal and the statutory definition of 
dismissal is set out in section 186(1) of the LRA. In terms of this section 
‘dismissal’ is defined as the termination of a contract of employment with or 
without notice;42 the failure to renew a fixed term contract of employment when 
an employee had an expectation of renewal;43 the refusal to allow an employee 
to resume work after she took maternity leave;44 an employer dismissed a 
number of employees for the same or similar reason and has only offered to re-
                                                 
40 J Grogan Dismissal (2010)  142 
41 Ibid 143 
42 Section 186(1)(a) of the LRA 
43 Section 186(1)(b) of the LRA 
44 Section 186(1)(c) of the LRA 
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employ one or more of them but has refused to re-employ the others;45 
constructive dismissal wherein the employer made the employment relationship 
so intolerable for the employee that he or she had no option but to resign46 and 
where an employee terminates a contract of employment, after a transfer in 
terms of section 197 or section 197A of the LRA, as the employer provided the 
employee with working conditions that were substantially less favourable to the 
employee than those provided by the old employer.47 
 
Paragraph (a) of the dismissal definition is the only termination (dismissal) 
recognised by the common law.48 At common law the contract could be 
terminated lawfully by either party giving the required notice or in the case of a 
fixed term contract, by the expiry of the time period or the occurrence of a 
specified event.49 Under the common law a termination with the required notice 
was regarded as lawful and left an employee with no legal remedy for his or her 
dismissal. Summary dismissal (ie: dismissal without notice) left an employee with 
a remedy for breach of the notice period unless there was a justifiable reason for 
not giving notice.50 Technically speaking, a summary dismissal would only bring 
the contract to an end if the other party accepted the repudiation.51 In terms of 
the common law dismissed employees may sue for breach of contract, if by the 
termination, they can prove that the employer breached an express, implied or 
tacit term of the contract.52 Where the employer repudiates the employment 
contract, an employee may elect to either accept the repudiation and sue for 
contractual damages or hold the employer to the contract and sue for specific 
performance.53 
 
                                                 
45 Section 186(1)(d) of the LRA 
46 Section 186(1)(e) of the LRA 
47 Section 186(1)(f) of the LRA 




52 SAMSA v McKenzie, supra; J Grogan Dismissal (2010) 13 
53 J Grogan Dismissal (2010)  13 
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In terms of section 186(1) of the LRA a lawful termination of the contract of 
employment now amounts to a dismissal. Further to that, the failure to renew a 
fixed term contract, refusal to allow an employee to resume work after a 
pregnancy, selective non re-employment and certain resignations can now also 
amount to a dismissal.54 The common law would not have regarded these as a 
repudiation of contract.55  
 
The question of whether a dismissal occurred is a separate issue, and must be 
answered first, before an enquiry into its fairness is determined. The onus of 
establishing that a dismissal occurred rests with the employee. The duty of 
proving that the dismissal was fair rests with the employer.56  
 
2.6 Permissible Grounds for Dismissal 
 
The LRA provides that there are only three permissible grounds for dismissal, 
and that the dismissal must be for a fair reason [section 188(1)(a)], and that a fair 
procedure must be followed [section 188(1)(b)]. Within the workplace dismissal 
can occur on three recognised grounds, namely in respect to the conduct of the 
employee, the capacity of the employee to perform the job and the operational 
requirements of the employer.57 All types of dismissals must be both procedurally 
and substantively fair. Section 185 of the LRA provides that ‘every employee has 
the right not to be unfairly dismissed and section 188(1) provides that a dismissal 
that is not automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails to prove that the 
reason for dismissal is a fair reason relating to the employee’s conduct or 
capacity or was based on the employer’s operational requirements. The 
dismissal must also be effected in accordance with a fair procedure.’ If an 
employer fails to do or prove this then the dismissal is unfair.58  Automatically 
                                                 
54 Ibid 
55 Ibid 
56 Section 192(2) of the LRA; Ibid 
57 H Landis …et al. Employment and the Law (2005) 159; Section 188(1) of the LRA 
58 Item 2(4) of Schedule 8, Code of Good Practice: Dismissal 
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unfair dismissals are dealt with in terms of section 187(1) of the LRA, and are 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
 
2.7 Substantive Fairness 
 
Section 188(2) of the LRA provides that: 
 
‘any person considering whether or not the reason for dismissal is a fair 
reason or whether or not the dismissal was effected in accordance with a 
fair procedure must take into account any relevant Code of Good Practice 
issued in terms of this Act.’ 
 
The Code emphasises the need for employment justice, efficiency and mutual 
respect between employers and employees. 
 
Item 1(3) of the Code states that: 
 
‘The key principle in this Code is that employers and employees should 
treat one another with mutual respect. A premium is placed on both 
employment justice and the efficient operation of business. While 
employees should be protected from arbitrary action, employers are 
entitled to satisfactory conduct and work performance from their 
employees.’ 
 
The substantive fairness of a dismissal is thus determined with reference to item 
7 of the Code. The LRA provides that dismissal must be in accordance with a fair 
procedure and for a fair reason. In other words, the dismissal must be both 
procedurally and substantively fair.59 In fact all disciplinary action must be in 
accordance with a fair procedure and the outcome or sanction imposed must 
also be fair and just, in relation to the infraction committed by the employee. The 
                                                 
59 Section 188 of the LRA 
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requirements of procedural and substantive fairness do not only relate to 
dismissal cases, but extend to disciplinary action short of dismissal in terms of 
section 185 of the LRA.  
 
Item 7 of the Code outlines the requirements of substantive fairness: namely that 
the ‘rule which the employee is alleged to have contravened existed, that the 
employee was aware of the rule or could be expected to have been aware of the 
rule, that the rule was valid or reasonable, that the rule has been consistently 
applied, that the employee transgressed the rule and that dismissal was an 
appropriate sanction for contravention of the rule.’ The determination of an 
appropriate or fair sanction for misconduct is one of the most problematic areas 
for employers in so far as discipline is concerned. This is especially so when 
determining whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction for breach of a rule.  
 
At common law, employees have the responsibility to refrain from misconduct 
generally, especially that which undermines the employment relationship.60 The 
Code states that employers should adopt rules that regulate the standards and 
conduct required from employees in the workplace.61 It is also evident from the 
CCMA Guidelines that the employer’s disciplinary code is of fundamental 
importance in determining the fairness of the sanction of dismissal. This also 
accords with the Sidumo62 decision which states that the employer is at liberty to 
set the rules and standards of conduct required from employees in terms of its 
operational risk requirements. It is necessary for employers to communicate the 
standards and rules that exist within the workplace clearly and understandably to 
employees and reaffirm them from time to time if any indulgence has been 
shown.63  
 
                                                 
60
 Country Fair Foods v CCMA and others, supra at para 11, Sidumo & others v Rustenberg Platinum Mines & others 
(CC), supra at paras 67 & 176, CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct Arbitrations Gazette No. 34573 para 89 to 91; J Grogan 
Workplace Law 10th ed (2009) 52 
61 Item 3(2) of Schedule 8, Code of Good Practice: Dismissals 
62 Sidumo v Rustenberg Platinum Mines (CC), supra 
63 A Myburgh “Determining and Reviewing Sanction after Sidumo” (2010) (31) ILJ 11 - 12 
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If an employee is found to have committed misconduct the next question, is 
whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction.64 In this regard, the Code must be 
referred to.  
 
Item 3(4) of the Code states the following: 
 
‘Generally, it is not appropriate to dismiss an employee for a first offence, 
except if the misconduct is serious and of such gravity that it makes a 
continued employment relationship intolerable. Examples of serious 
misconduct, subject to the rule that each case should be judged on its 
merits, are gross dishonesty or wilful damage to the property of the 
employer, wilful endangering of the safety of others, physical assault on 
the employer, a fellow employee, client or customer and gross 
insubordination.’  
 
The Code adds an important proviso: that each case should be judged on its own 
merits and even these listed types of disciplinary offences do not always justify 
dismissal. 
 
With respect to dismissal for misconduct the Code states further at Item 3(5) that 
in addition to the severity of the offence the personal circumstances of the 
employee need also to be taken into account. This would include length of 
service, previous disciplinary record and other personal circumstances. Other 
factors that also need to be considered are the nature of the job and the 
circumstances in which the misconduct occurred. The employer must also be 
consistent in the application of discipline.65 
 
                                                 
64 D du Toit…et al. Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide. 4ed. (1999) 353 
65 Item 3(6) of the Code 
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The CCMA has also issued guidelines for misconduct arbitrations to promote 
consistent decision making when dealing with dismissals for misconduct.66 The 
guidelines were drafted after the Sidumo67 decision and highlight how the CCMA 
has interpreted the judgment.68 In terms of the guidelines commissioners must 
consider the following factors when determining whether dismissal was an 
appropriate sanction.69 These are, the gravity of the contravention of the rule, the 
consistent application of the rule and any other factors that may justify a different 
sanction. 
 
In line with the Sidumo70 decision, the CCMA Guidelines state the following: 
 
‘The test is whether the employer could fairly have imposed the sanction 
of dismissal in the circumstances, either because the misconduct on its 
own rendered the continued employment relationship intolerable, or 
because of the cumulative effect of the misconduct when taken together 
with other instances of misconduct.’71 (Emphasis added) 
 
In respect to the gravity of the misconduct, commissioners are required to 
consider the sanction stipulated in the disciplinary code and procedure and then 
mitigating and aggravating factors that may make the transgression more or less 
severe.72 In respect to sanctions prescribed in the disciplinary code, they would 
be considered appropriate sanctions if they are serious and accord with the 
disciplinary code and judicial precedent. Any sanction provided for in the 
disciplinary code must be considered in the light of any relevant factors in 
aggravation and mitigation of sanction.73 With respect to aggravating and 
mitigating factors, this enquiry would require an analysis of the actual 
                                                 
66 CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct Arbitrations, supra 
67 Sidumo v Rustenberg Platinum Mines (CC), supra 
68 A Myburgh “Determining and Reviewing Sanction after Sidumo” (2010) (31) ILJ 10 
69 Para E of the CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct Arbitrations, supra 
70 Sidumo v Rustenberg Platinum Mines, supra 
71 Para 92; A Myburgh “Determining and Reviewing Sanction after Sidumo” (2010) (31) ILJ 10 
72 A Myburgh “Determining and Reviewing Sanction after Sidumo” (2010) (31) ILJ 10 
73 Ibid 11 
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circumstances surrounding the transgression. Aggravating factors would entail a 
consideration of whether the act was willful or intentional, whether there was lack 
of remorse, failure to admit responsibility when there was overwhelming 
evidence, dishonesty during the hearing, nature of the job and damage or loss 
caused to the employer.74 Mitigating factors would include remorse shown, no 
loss or damage caused to the employer, accepting responsibility for the 
misconduct and owning up thereto and whether the employee is willing to submit 
to a lesser sanction and corrective behaviour.75 Depending on the circumstances 
of the case, aggravating factors may warrant a more severe sanction than that 
stipulated in the disciplinary code whilst mitigating factors may call for a lesser 
sanction.76  
 
With respect to the requirement that sanctions be imposed consistently, this 
entails the requirement of both historical and contemporaneous consistency. 
Where inconsistency is raised, an employer must have a legitimate reason for 
differentiating between the two employees otherwise the disparity will be 
regarded as unfair.77 This aspect will be discussed in more detail hereunder. 
 
In respect of factors justifying a lesser sanction than dismissal, the main factor to 
be considered relate to operational risk, being the risk of further acts of 
misconduct and the risk of harm to the enterprise as a consequence thereof.78 
Other factors to be considered in this regard are the employee’s personal 
circumstances (including the employee’s service record and length of service), 
the nature of the job (risk of repetition of misconduct poses an operational risk to 
the enterprise and destroys the trust relationship) and the circumstances of the 
contravention (including provocation, remorse, coercion and the absence of 







dishonesty).79 The parity principle is also important. This requires that discipline 
be administered consistently and fairly. 
 
In summary, when considering dismissal an employer must bear various factors 
in mind.80 These include the internal policies and procedures, legislative 
obligations, the various Codes of Good Practice issued in terms of Acts, 
obligations established in terms of contract and collective agreements, judicial 
precedent created through case law and arbitration awards, best practices within 
the industry and the CCMA guidelines for dismissal arbitrations.81 
 
By following these requirements the employer will go a long way towards 
ensuring that dismissals are procedurally and substantively fair. This will also 
prevent unfair dismissal disputes as well as dismissals being found to be unfair at 
arbitration. This will save the employer in terms of time and litigation costs.82 
 
The requirements of a substantively fair dismissal exists to ensure that there is a 
fair reason for finding that an employee has transgressed a rule and that the 
sanction imposed for doing so is also fair. As stated above, employers will be 
guided by a variety of factors including the Code of Good Practice, the 
disciplinary code, the norms within the sector, the CCMA guidelines for 
arbitrators as well as jurisprudence developed by the courts.  Substantive 
fairness essentially deals with the reasons or grounds for the dismissal of an 
employee. However, even for sanctions short of dismissal the same principle 
applies.83 In other words, the employee must actually be guilty of the misconduct 
for which he or she has been charged and the sanction imposed must be 
commensurate with the misconduct for which the employee has been found 
guilty. 
 
                                                 
79 Ibid; CCMA Guidelines: Misconduct Arbitrations 
80 H Landis …et al. Employment and the Law (2005) 159 
81 Ibid 
82 Ibid 159 - 160 
83 Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe (2000) 21 ILJ 340 (LAC) at para 50 
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The Code although recognising an employer’s right to dismiss, even for a first 
offence, also encourages and promotes the concept of corrective and 
progressive discipline. In this regard an employee’s conduct is corrected through 
a graduated system of counselling and warnings.84 This will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter four below. The Code by its very nature and considering the 
complexities as well as the uniqueness of workplace relations is purposely 
general.85 The Code also recognises that disciplinary cases are unique and that 
therefore departures from the Code may be justified in certain circumstances.86 
The LRA and the Code provides an informative framework to guide and assist 
employers in fairly and correctly instituting disciplinary action. This is bolstered by 
adding into the mix the employer’s disciplinary code, the norms within the sector, 
the CCMA guidelines for arbitrators as well as jurisprudence developed by the 
courts. Therein lies the recipe for determining a fair sanction for misconduct, 
however as can be seen from judicial precedents this recipe is not always 
foolproof. It is not a simple ‘tick box’ exercise. The reason for this is that the 
dynamics in workplaces are different and cases need to be judged on their own 
merits with due regard to the parity principle. However, the most pressing issue 
in going about determining a fair sanction for misconduct is the concept of 
fairness itself. It is a relative concept with no universal application. What one may 
regard as fair another may regard as unfair. Ones appreciation of fairness is 
influenced by ones background, upbringing, culture, religion and the like.  From 
this perspective one makes a judgment in respect of fairness and these decisions 
are not always the same. Some may say that we are still star gazing in so far as 
determining a fair sanction for misconduct is concerned but at the end of the day 
the decision is based on reasonableness and one must not act irrationally or 
capriciously, just fairly.87 In this regard in a dismissal dispute, a commissioner will 
need to decide the issue with his or her own sense of fairness based on the facts 
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before him or her. A value judgment is made when considering the fairness of the 
employer’s decision to dismiss, taking all relevant circumstances into account. A 
commissioner must not determine afresh what the appropriate sanction is but 
must determine whether the employer’s decision to dismiss is fair.88 This aspect 
will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter three, below.  
 
CHAPTER 3: DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION 
 
3.1 Overall Test 
 
This chapter will further consider the question on how to determine a fair sanction 
for misconduct. In respect of dismissal matters the overall test is whether there 
has been an irretrievable breakdown of the employment relationship. The 
determination of a fair sanction will be considered from the perspective of the 
employer and the arbitrating commissioner. Particular emphasis will be placed on 
the consideration of fairness and how our legal position has transformed from the 
‘defer to the employer position’ that is inherent in the reasonable employer test to 
the reasonable commissioner test. Historically, employers determined the 
standards of conduct required of employee and the sanctions to be imposed for 
breaches thereof. Commissioners would only interfere with sanctions if the 
sanction imposed was ‘shocking’ and manifestly unfair.89 However, the position 
has changed and commissioners are no longer required to defer to the 
employer’s choice of sanction. This will be considered in detail hereunder. Then 
an in depth analysis will be made in order to establish whether the position in so 
far as determining a fair sanction for misconduct has become any clearer for 
employers and commissioners or whether there is there still a veil of uncertainty 
in so far as determining a fair sanction for misconduct. 
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As stated above, the determination of an appropriate sanction for misconduct is 
one of the most problematic areas of our labour law jurisprudence.90 The basic 
requirement is that the sanction imposed must be appropriate.91 This is one of 
the requirements of substantive fairness. In terms of Item 3(4) of the Code of 
Good Practice: Dismissal, the appropriateness of a sanction is dependent on the 
seriousness of the infraction and its impact on the trust relationship.92 The use of 
the word ‘appropriate’ indicates that it is impossible to lay down rigid rules in this 
regard. Each case must be considered on its own merits.93 
 
3.2 Value Judgment 
 
When a chairperson of a disciplinary enquiry makes a decision in respect to 
whether or not an employee has committed misconduct, this decision needs to 
be made in a two stage process.94 Firstly, the guilt of the employee must be 
established in terms of the evidence presented.95 The second part of the enquiry 
is the determination of an appropriate sanction. This is done with reference to the 
severity of the misconduct committed and the impact that it has had on the 
employment relationship. However, all relevant factors need to be taken into 
consideration in determining a fair sanction. The requirement of this two stage 
approach is desirable but not absolute. In Eddels (SA) Pty Ltd v Sewcharan & 
others,96 the court held that although the two stage approach is desirable it noted 
that it would be unfair to expect an employer to observe this approach when 
commissioners are not required to do so.97 In other words, it is preferable that 
mitigation is dealt with separately after a finding of guilt has been made. 
However, chairpersons of disciplinary enquiries are lay persons and they cannot 
be expected to be familiar with the law. So the mere failure to have a distinct two 
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stage enquiry is not a material procedural breach that will render the enquiry 
unfair. The rider here is that mitigating factors must have been considered or at 
least dealt with in the initial stage of the enquiry. In determining an appropriate 
sanction chairpersons are required to make up their own minds but they are 
permitted to seek advice before making a final decision on sanction. However, 
the decision should not be prescribed by third parties.98  
 
When determining whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction, an arbitrator is 
essentially making a value judgment over which reasonable people may 
disagree. However, arbitrators will be guided by the codes of good practice (in 
terms of section 138(6) of the LRA), the employer’s disciplinary code, principles 
established by the courts and the context of the misconduct. 
 
When determining whether a sanction is appropriate the manner of assessment 
by a court or commissioner becomes relevant. It is also important to consider the 
stage at which the assessment occurs. Is the court or arbitrator exercising an 
independent decision as to whether the sanction is fair or is the court or arbitrator 
merely assessing whether the employer’s decision is reasonable and fair?99 If a 
party is exercising an independent decision with respect to sanction then that 
party is free to draw up his or her own conclusion in respect of the fairness of the 
sanction chosen by the employer.100 However, a party confined to assessing the 
reasonableness and fairness of the sanction imposed by an employer may only 
interfere with the sanction imposed if the sanction is found to be unreasonable 
and unfair when judged against independent criteria.101 This will be discussed 
more fully hereunder.  
 
In Mzeku v Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd the LAC stated:  
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‘Where the conduct for which the employees are dismissed is 
unacceptable but the sanction is, in all the circumstances not a fair 
sanction, the dismissal cannot be said to be substantively fair.’102 
 
In terms of the Code, a dismissal will be unfair if it is not in accordance with a fair 
procedure and for a fair reason, even if the prescribed notice period is given in 
terms of the contract of employment or legislative provisions. The decision as to 
whether the dismissal is substantially fair is established by the facts of the case, 
and the appropriateness of dismissal as a sanction.103 In this regard a 
commissioner needs to establish, as was put in Engen Petroleum Ltd v CCMA & 
others [2007] 8 BLLR 707 (LAC), the following: ‘Is this dismissal fair?’ This 
question is answered by the commissioner alone.104 In Engen Petroleum the LAC 
stated that: 
 
‘The ordinary and natural meaning of the word ‘fair’ suggests that 
commissioners must answer that question of their own sense of fairness. 
The question cannot possibly be answered on the basis of someone else’s 
notion of fairness. This was the position adopted by the courts under the 
1956 LRA. There is no basis for assuming that the position has changed 
under the current LRA.’ 
 
Employers are entitled to dismiss employees who commit misconduct. However, 
dismissal is only justified if the reason advanced for doing so is fair in relation to 
the nature of the misconduct committed. Therefore the nature of the misconduct 
must be serious or repetitive in nature.105 As a starting point, discipline should be 
corrective and progressive in nature whereby an employee’s unacceptable 
conduct is modified through a process of graduated disciplinary action, 
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commencing with counselling and warnings.106 However, certain acts of 
misconducts are so serious that they justify dismissal even for a first offence.107 
 
The Code of Good Practice: Dismissal also requires that dismissal must be an 
appropriate sanction, in respect of the circumstances of the case.108 There is no 
hard and fast rule that indicates when it is appropriate to dismiss. There is also 
no exact legal principle for determining whether dismissal or a lesser sanction 
would be appropriate.109Therefore chairpersons of disciplinary hearings are 
required to exercise their discretion in determining a fair sanction reasonably, 
honestly and fairly.110 
 
Further, before deciding on an appropriate sanction an employee’s personal 
circumstances, nature of job and circumstances surrounding the transgression 
need to be taken into consideration. This would include, amongst others, length 
of service, previous disciplinary record and personal circumstances.111 The 
employer must also be consistent in the application of discipline.112  
 
The LAC held in Nampak Corrugated Wadeville v Khoza113 that when 
determining the appropriateness of a dismissal sanction, adjudicators have a 
limited role of ensuring that dismissals do not exceed a ‘band of reasonableness’ 
the extent of which is determined by fairness.114 This essentially entails a value 
judgment and is not based on law.115 Therefore it is possible for two people to 
disagree on whether dismissal was an appropriate sanction and there are other 
situations where no reasonable person would agree that dismissal was an 
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appropriate sanction.116 The role of an arbitrator is to safeguard against the latter 
occurring.117 
 
In Branford v Metrorail Services (Durban) & others,118 the court stated: 
 
‘The concept of fairness, in this regard, applies to both the employer and 
employee. It involves the balancing of competing and sometimes conflicting 
interests of the employer, on the one hand, and the employee on the other. 
The weight to be attached to those respective interests depends largely on 
the overall circumstances of each case. In National Union of Metal Workers 
of SA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd 1996 (4) SA 577 (A); (1996) 17 ILJ 455 
(A), Smalberger JA made the following remarks on fairness at 589C-D: 
‘Fairness comprehends that regard must be had not only to the position and 
interests of the worker, but also those of the employer, in order to make a 
balanced and equitable assessment. In judging fairness, a court applies a 
moral or value judgment to establish facts and circumstances (NUM v Free 
State Cons at 4461). And in doing so it must have due regard to the 
objectives sought to be achieved by the Act. In my view, it would be unwise 
and undesirable to lay down, or attempt to lay down, any universal 
applicable test for deciding what is fair.’119 (at 2278H – 2279A) 
 
The central question remains as to how you establish that a dismissal is so 
unreasonable and unfair that no reasonable person would agree that it was an 
appropriate sanction.120 We need to bear in mind that we are dealing with a value 
judgment which is informed by an individual’s upbringing, life experiences and 
cultural beliefs. There is no absolute test for determining whether dismissal is an 
appropriate sanction.121 As stated above, the decision is based on a value 
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judgment although it is underpinned by judicial precedent. After all fairness is a 
relative concept. 
 
The LAC in Country Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others,122 stated that: 
 
‘It remains part of our law that it lies in the first place within the province of 
the employer to set the standards of conduct to be observed by its 
employees and to determine the sanction with which non compliance will 
be visited, interference therewith is only  justified in the case of 
unreasonableness and unfairness.’  
 
The court also went on to state that interference would only be justified if the 
sanction ‘is so excessive or lenient that in all good conscience it cannot be 
allowed to stand.’123 However, if the decision maker merely thinks that he or she 
would not have imposed the same sanction, then it is not open to interference.124 
Therefore a dismissal for misconduct may be unreasonable and inappropriate if it 
induces a ‘sense of shock’.125 In other words, it is ‘so excessive as to shock one’s 
sense of fairness.’126 
 
In Consani Engineering (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others,127 the court stated the 
following with respect to the determination of a fair sanction: 
 
‘As has been stated in various cases, a commissioner should appreciate 
that the question of sanction for misconduct is one on which reasonable 
people can readily differ. There is a range of possible sanctions on which 
one person might take a view different from another without either of them 
being castigated as unreasonable. If the sanction falls within a range of 
                                                 
122 Ibid; (1999) 20 ILJ 1701 (LAC) at para 11 
123 Ibid 
124 Ibid at para 43 
125 J Grogan Dismissal (2010) 156 
126 Country Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others, supra 
127 (2004) 13 LC 1.11.13 
 31
reasonable options a commissioner should generally uphold the sanction, 
even if the sanction is not one that the commissioner herself would have 
imposed.’128 
 
The labour court went on to state that interference with sanction would only be 
justified if there was a ‘striking disparity’ between the employer’s choice of 
sanction and the one that the commissioner would have imposed.129  
 
In Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & others,130 the LAC indicated that the 
basis for interference with sanction is if there was a ‘yawning chasm between the 
sanction which the court would have imposed and the sanction imposed by the 
commissioner’. 
 
In Minister of Correctional Services v Mthembu NO131 the Labour Court held that 
an arbitrator’s function is to determine whether the employer’s decision to 
dismiss is ‘fair’ and he or she is not to exercise an independent discretion in this 
regard.  
 
The Constitutional Court in Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd132 finally 
brought some clarity in respect of determining the appropriateness of sanction. 
One of the issues that the court had to decide was whether it was sufficient for an 
employer to prove that the sanction of dismissal was a fair sanction as opposed 
to the only fair sanction.133 The SCA134 had endorsed the concept that sanctions 
move along a sliding scale and that commissioners should only interfere with the 
sanction if it ‘fell outside the band of reasonable sanctions’.135 The SCA was 
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endorsing the concept that commissioners must determine if the sanction is a fair 
one as opposed to the only fair sanction.136 This was effectively the ‘defer to the 
employer’ notion or the ‘reasonable employer’ test.137 The SCA held that 
commissioners must recognise that employers are vested with the right to 
determine the appropriate sanction for proven misconduct and that interference 
with the sanction is only justified if the decision is manifestly or demonstrably 
unfair.138  The court, per Cameron AJ, held that in terms of the Code of Good 
Practice: Dismissal that employers have the right to determine the appropriate 
sanction for proven misconduct. The court stated that: ‘The fact that the 
commissioner may think that a different sanction would also be fair, or fairer, or 
even more than fair, does not justify setting aside the employer’s sanction.’139 
The SCA did not expressly refer to the ‘reasonable employer test’ when dealing 
with the appropriateness of a sanction. The court was not concerned with 
reasonableness but rather fairness. In respect of fairness Cameron AJ stated the 
following: 
 
‘The criterion of fairness denotes a range of possible responses, all of 
which could properly be described as fair. The use of “fairness” in 
everyday language reflects this. We may describe a decision as “very fair” 
(when we mean that it was generous to the offender); or “more than fair” 
(when we mean that it was lenient); or we may say that it was “tough, but 
fair”, or even “severe, but fair” (meaning that while one’s own decisional 
response might have been different, it is not possible to brand the actual 
response unfair). It is this latter category, particularly, that CCMA 
commissioners must exercise great caution in evaluating decisions to 
dismiss. The mere fact that a CCMA commissioner may have imposed a 
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different sanction does not justify concluding that the sanction was 
unfair.’140 (Emphasis added) 
 
Cameron JA went on to state the commissioners must be vigilant when 
determining whether an employer’s sanction was fair and there must be a 
deference to the employer’s choice of sanction. The reason for this was that, in 
terms of the LRA, it was primarily the responsibility of the employer to determine 
an appropriate sanction.’141 Further, a commissioner need not be convinced that 
dismissal is the only fair sanction. The LRA requires the employer to merely 
establish that dismissal is a fair sanction. The fact that a commissioner may think 
that another sanction may also be fair does not justify interference with the 
employer’s choice of sanction.142  
 
It has been argued that Cameron JA transformed the ‘reasonable employer test’ 
into the ’fair employer test’ and established the principle that as long as the 
employer’s decision fell within a range of fairness, as opposed to 
reasonableness, the commissioner should defer thereto.143 
 
Cameron JA, at the request of the parties, went on to determine the fairness of 
the dismissal in line with his approach to determine sanction in relation to the 
facts of the case. He considered the gravity of the misconduct which exposed the 
mine to serious risk but also took into account the employee’s clean record and 
long service. However, as the employee’s conduct breached the core duty which 
was entrusted to him his conducted had violated the trust relationship. Although 
Cameron JA accepted that the sanction of dismissal may appear severe it was in 
his view impossible to say that it was not a fair sanction. He found that it fell 
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within a range of sanctions that an employer may fairly impose.144 Ultimately the 
dismissal was held to be a fair sanction. 
 
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision was subsequently overruled 
by the Constitutional Court.  As will be seen, the Constitutional Court was in 
agreement with Cameron JA’s approach of weighing up the employee’s clean 
record and length of service against the severity of the offence when considering 
the fairness of the sanction of dismissal.145 However, the Constitutional Court 
found that Cameron JA erred by not deciding himself whether the dismissal was 
fair and rather finding that the dismissal fell within a notional range of fair 
responses to the misconduct committed.146  
 
The Constitutional Court examined both the Constitution and our legislative 
framework and found that nothing therein indicates that when determining the 
fairness of a sanction a commissioner must approach the matter from the 
employer’s perspective. The court held that our legislation indicates the contrary 
and commissioners are required to determine the fairness of the dismissal as an 
‘impartial adjudicator.’ In performing this role, a commissioner must, amongst 
other things, consider and show ‘respect’ for the employer’s decision with respect 
to sanction.147 This is also in line with Article 8 of the International Labour 
Organisation Convention on Termination of Employment 158 of 1982. The court 
held that SCA was incorrect in finding that the ‘defer to the employer’ approach is 
part of our labour law jurisprudence.148 This would invariably tilt the scale against 
employees which would be contrary to our constitutional standards and the right 
to fair labour practices. This approach would also not promote labour peace. 149  
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The Constitutional Court stated the following: 
 
‘It is a practical reality that, in the first place, it is the employer who hires 
and fires. The act of dismissal forms the jurisdictional basis for a 
commissioner, in the event of an unresolved dismissal dispute, to conduct 
an arbitration in terms of the LRA. The commissioner determines whether 
the dismissal is fair. There are, therefore, no competing ‘discretions’. 
Employers and commissioners each play a different part. The CCMA 
correctly submitted that the decision to dismiss belongs to the employer 
but the determination of its fairness does not. Ultimately the 
commissioner’s sense of fairness is what must prevail and not the 
employer’s view. An impartial third party determination on whether or not a 
dismissal was fair is likely to promote labour peace.’150 
 
In terms of the Constitutional Court judgment in Sidumo the test now for 
determining the appropriateness of sanction for misconduct is based on fairness 
and the misconduct must be sufficiently serious to justify dismissal. There is no 
longer deference to the employer’s decision regarding sanction. Whether 
dismissal is fair will depend on whether the misconduct itself rendered the 
employment relationship intolerable or whether cumulatively with past 
transgressions it had done so. In this regard a commissioner needs to decide the 
issue with his or her own sense of fairness based on the facts before him or her. 
A value judgment is made when assessing the fairness of the employer’s 
decision to dismiss, taking all relevant circumstances into account. A 
commissioner must not determine afresh what the appropriate sanction is, but 
must determine whether the employer’s decision to dismiss is fair.151 The 
‘reasonable employer test’ or any variation thereof has been replaced by the 
‘impartial commissioner test’. Whilst the former was skewed in favour of the 
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employer the latter is neutral and is not biased in favour of employees.152 The 
‘impartial commissioner test’ endeavours to ensure unconditional neutrality on 
the part of commissioner’s in determining sanction.153 
 
The Constitutional Court held that when a commissioner considers a dismissal 
dispute he or she must do so impartially and take the totality of circumstances 
into account. He or she must consider the importance of the rule that has been 
breached as well as the reason why the employer imposed the sanction of 
dismissal. The commissioner must also consider the reason for the employee’s 
challenge to the sanction of dismissal. Other factors that require consideration 
are the harm caused by the employee’s misconduct and whether further 
instruction and training may result in the employee not committing the offence 
again. A commissioner must also consider what impact the dismissal will have on 
the employee as well as the employee’s personal circumstances, such as long 
service. The list is not exhaustive and all relevant circumstances need to be 
taken into consideration.’154  
 
This means that a commissioner does not ‘start with a blank page’ and determine 
afresh what the appropriate sanction is.155 The starting point is the employer’s 
decision to dismiss. In this regard a commissioner’s function is not to ask what 
the appropriate sanction is, but whether the employer’s decision to dismiss is 
fair.156 The answer to the question is not always easy and the commissioner 
must pass a value judgment. The ‘exercise of a value judgment is something that 
reasonable people may differ over.’157 However, this is not an unconstrained 
value judgment that is determined by the views, background and perspective of 
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the commissioner.158 Fairness dictates that regard must be given to the interests 
of both the workers and employers.159 
 
In Fidelity Cash Management Services v CCMA and others,160 Zondo JP (as he 
then was) applied the Sidumo test as follows: 
 
‘Once the commissioner has considered all the above factors and others 
not mentioned herein, he or she would have to answer the question 
whether dismissal was, in all the circumstances, a fair sanction in such a 
case. In answering that question, he or she would have to use his or her 
own sense of fairness. That the commissioner is required to use his or her 
own sense of justice or fairness to decide the fairness or otherwise of the 
dismissal does not mean that he or she is at liberty to act arbitrarily or 
capriciously or to be mala fide. He or she is required to make a decision or 
finding that is reasonable.’161 (Emphasis added) 
 
It is also worth noting that whilst the Constitutional Court decision in respect of 
Sidumo was pending the LAC in Engen Petroleum Ltd v CCMA & others162 
considered whether the ‘reasonable employer test’ had any place in our law.163 
The court examined two lines of thinking, the first being the ‘own approach’ in 
terms of which commissioners must make up their own mind whether or not the 
dismissal was fair. This test is also premised on what Zondo JP referred to as the 
‘reasonable citizen’ test whereby a commissioner must place himself in the 
position of a ‘reasonable citizen’ and reach conclusions that he thinks a 
‘reasonable citizen’ would make with all the relevant information placed before 
him. The ‘reasonable citizen’ is ‘neutral and his values are neither exclusively the 
                                                 
158 Ibid 
159 Ibid 
160 [2008] 3 BLLR 197 (LAC) 
161 Fidelity Cash Management Services v CCMA and others, supra at paras 94 -95 
162 [2007] 8 BLLR 707 (LAC) 
163 J Grogan Dismissal (2010) 160 
 38
employer’s nor the employee’s’.164 The second approach considered was the 
‘reasonable employer’ approach which requires commissioners to respect the 
employers’ decision with respect to sanction and only to interfere with the 
sanction if it is so severe that it ‘induces a sense of shock.’165 The LAC held that 
the ‘defer to the employer’ approach was in contravention of our statutory dispute 
resolution procedure which provided impartial commissioners to resolve disputes. 
The court found that when adjudicating unfair dismissal disputes commissioners 
are enjoined to exercise their own opinion in respect of the fairness of the 
dismissal.166 However, ultimately the court held that it was bound by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in Sidumo which was binding at the time. As 
will be seen hereunder, the ‘reasonable citizen test’ accords with the ‘impartial 
commissioner’ approach that was advocated by the Constitutional Court which 
had the final say in the Sidumo decision.   
 
After Sidumo, an employer who complies with all the requirements of Item 7 of 
the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal may still find that a commissioner may rule 
that the dismissal is an inappropriate sanction, as the test is that of a reasonable 
commissioner and no longer that of a reasonable employer.167  
 
Since Sidumo, the Constitutional Court has again had the opportunity to consider 
the role of commissioners and their process related obligations when conducting 
arbitrations. In CUSA v Tao Ying Metal Industries and others,168 the court held 
that a commissioner is compelled to apply his or her mind to the issues in a case. 
Commissioners who do not comply with their obligations will not be acting 
lawfully and/or reasonably and therefore that decision will constitute a breach of 
the right to fair administration. The commissioner is enjoined to determine the 
material facts of the case and thereafter to apply the provisions of the LRA to 
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those facts in answering the question whether the dismissal was for a fair 
reason.169 
 
In Fidelity Cash Management Services v CCMA & others,170 the LAC provided a 
‘checklist’ for commissioners when considering substantive fairness. The LAC 
stated that in terms of the Sidumo judgment commissioners must take into 
account the totality of circumstances, they must consider the importance of the 
rule that has been breached and the reasons the employer imposed the sanction 
of dismissal, and he or she must take into account the basis of the employee’s 
challenge to the dismissal. Commissioners must consider the harm caused by 
the employee’s conduct and whether additional training and instruction may 
result in the employee not repeating the misconduct. Commissioners must also 
take the employee’s service record and what effect the dismissal will have on the 
employee, into consideration.171 
 
This list is not exhaustive and commissioners are also required to consider the 
code and the relevant provisions of any statute.172 The court went on to state 
that: 
 
‘Once the commissioner has considered all the above factors and others 
not mentioned herein, he or she would then have to answer the question 
whether dismissal was, in all the circumstances, a fair sanction in such a 
case. In answering the question, he or she would have to use his or her 
own sense of fairness.’173 (Emphasis added) 
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It is self evident from this passage that a commissioner is only in a position to 
decide on the fairness of the sanction of dismissal after considering all relevant 
factors and must use his own sense of fairness in deciding on sanction.174 They 
must not substitute their personal opinions for that of the employer by deciding 
afresh what they would have done as the employer with respect to sanction.175 
What this effectively means is that when a commissioner decides on the issue of 
guilt, he or she does so afresh without any regard to the employer’s decision. 
However, when determining the fairness of the sanction of dismissal, then this 
enquiry does not commence afresh. The commissioner, although not required to 
defer to the employer’s decision in respect to sanction, must show respect to the 
position adopted by the employer and attempt to appreciate and understand it.176 
The commissioner’s function is not to establish what the appropriate sanction is 
but rather to determine whether the employer’s decision to dismiss was fair.177 
 
In Theewaterkloof Municipality v SALGBC (Western Cape Division) & Others,178 
the court noted that when determining an appropriate sanction for proven 
misconduct, various factors need to be considered and weighed against the 
reasons advanced by the employer for its decision. While arbitrators are required 
to consider a range of factors, they are in the final analysis required to compare 
the reasons advanced by the employer to justify the dismissal with the reasons 
provided by an employee for challenging it. This is not altered by the fact that 
arbitrations under the LRA are hearings de novo. The court held that in terms of 
section 192 of the LRA the onus is on the employer to prove the fairness of the 
dismissal and the commissioner’s role thereafter is to consider whether the 
dismissal was indeed for a fair reason. Although commissioners are required to 
exercise their own discretion they are not entitled to consider afresh the issue 
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regarding sanction. When exercising their own discretion in respect of sanction, 
commissioners will be making a value judgment but they must guard against 
simply importing their own value judgments.  The court went on to state that 
dismissal arbitrations are a two fold process. The first phase requires the 
arbitrator to establish whether the employee was in fact guilty of misconduct. This 
is determined by the rules of evidence and no value judgment is made at this 
stage. The second phase requires arbitrators to identify and weigh up relevant 
factors to determine the appropriateness of sanction. Various factors must be 
considered including the facts of the case, statutory and policy framework and 
jurisprudence developed by the courts. Thereafter a value judgment must be 
made and will produce an unbiased answer to whether the dismissal was fair. In 
some cases the answer may be straightforward but in others a proper 
assessment will have to be made as to how the factors considered relate to the 
employer’s operational requirements. A complete analysis of all these factors will 
provide a framework for placing a value on one factor or another.179 
 
Notwithstanding this, the Sidumo180 judgment has still created some uncertainty 
in determining a fair sanction for misconduct. In Palaborwa Mining Co Ltd v 
Cheetham & others,181 the LAC held as follows in this regard: 
 
‘Sidumo enjoins a court to remind itself that the task to determine the 
fairness or otherwise of a dismissal falls primarily in the domain of the 
commissioner. This was the legislative intent and as much as decisions of 
different commissioners may lead to different results, it is unfortunately a 
situation which has to be endured with fortitude despite the uncertainty it 
may create.’ 
 
After the Sidumo decision, reviewing courts will be constrained in their ability to 
interfere with arbitration awards of commissioners regardless of whether they 
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adopt a strict or sympathetic approach.182 This became self-evident in Palaborwa 
Mining,183 where the Labour Court found that the commissioner had adopted too 
strict an approach and set the award aside on review. The LAC after considering 
the implications of Sidumo and on comparing the facts of the two cases found 
that the ‘obvious, inevitable and necessary conclusion’ was that the LC judge had 
substituted her views of fairness for that of the commissioner, and had thereby 
made incorrect findings.184 The facts of the case were as follows: Mr Cheetham, 
a company secretary was asked to blow into a breathalyzer during a random test. 
He was found to have had alcohol in his bloodstream and due to the company’s 
‘zero tolerance’ approach to being drunk on duty he was dismissed. The LC had 
found that the dismissal was unfair as the commissioner had failed to consider 
that Mr Cheetham had no outward signs of intoxication, he was a first offender 
and he was fifty eight years old. The LC awarded him compensation.185 As 
stated, above the LAC found that the LC judge had substituted her views for that 
of the commissioner and that in terms of the Sidumo judgment that was not 
permitted. A commissioner, acting impartially, must make a decision in respect of 
whether or not a dismissal is fair with all the material placed before him or her. 
The commissioner must not impose his or her value judgment by determining 
afresh whether or not the dismissal is fair. He or she must make a decision, after 
considering all relevant factors, as to whether or not the employer’s decision to 
dismiss is fair.  The LAC found that the commissioner had complied with his 
duties in this regard.  
 
In respect to dismissal dispute it is important to take cognizance of the remedies 
that are available to employees who dismissals are found to be substantively 
unfair. These are contained in section 193(2) of the LRA. Generally employees 
whose dismissals are found to be unfair are re-instated unless any of the 
circumstances contemplated in section 193(2) are applicable. In unfair dismissal 
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disputes, and in order to avoid re-instatement or re-employment, the employer 
would need to show that reinstatement is not appropriate as contemplated by 
sections 193(2)(b) and/or (c) of the LRA, namely that ‘the circumstances 
surrounding the dismissal are such that a continued employment relationship 
would be intolerable’ and/or that ‘it is not reasonably practicable for the employer 
to reinstate or re-employ the employee.’186  
 
An issue that arises is whether an employer must actually adduce evidence that 
the employment relationship has irreparably broken down or whether that can be 
inferred from the nature of the misconduct itself.187 Sidumo188 suggests that the 
employer must prove how the misconduct has impacted on the employment 
relationship and that progressive discipline in inappropriate.189 
 
Exactly what evidence is required to be led by the employer can be gleaned from 
the case of Edcon v Pillemer.190 The employee was dismissed for breaching the 
trust relationship by failing to report an accident that her son had had in the 
company vehicle. She had in fact repaired the vehicle at her husband’s panel 
beating workshop at her own cost. The employer found out about this some six 
months later and confronted the employee who initially denied that the vehicle 
had been involved in an accident and that her son was driving the vehicle. She 
subsequently recanted and admitted to the incident but was still untruthful 
regarding where and how the accident occurred. A CCMA commissioner found 
the dismissal substantively unfair as no evidence was led as to whether the trust 
relationship had broken down. The commissioner also took into account the 
applicants clean record and long service as well as the fact that the applicant 
was 2 years away from retirement. On appeal to the SCA, the court found that 
the award was not reviewable because the commissioner’s reliance on the fact 
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that the company had not led evidence to prove that the trust relationship had 
broken down could not be faulted.191 At the arbitration proceedings at the CCMA 
the company called the investigator, Ms Naidoo as a witness and submitted the 
minutes of both the disciplinary and appeal enquiry as documentary evidence. 
The SCA held as follows: 
 
‘What becomes immediately apparent is that Naidoo’s evidence did not, 
and could not, deal with the impact of Reddy’s conduct on the trust 
relationship. Neither did Naidoo testify that Reddy’s conduct had 
destroyed the trust relationship. This was the domain of those managers 
to whom Reddy reported. They are the persons who could shed light on 
the issue. None testified. Edcon’s policy regarding the misconduct at issue 
here was also before [the commissioner]. But this document is just that – a 
policy – and is no evidence of the consequences of misconduct based on 
it. On its own it evinces Reddy’s failure to comply with its dictates. It 
cannot be correct that mere production thereof would suffice to justify a 
decision to dismiss. The gravamen of Edcon’s case against Reddy was 
that her conduct breached the trust relationship.’192  
 
The SCA explained further that what would have been required was for someone 
in management who supervised Ms Reddy or interacted with her in the 
employment context, had to testify and explain to the commissioner how Ms 
Reddy’s conduct had breached the trust relationship. Evidence needed to be 
adduced to indicate what her duties and responsibilities were, what her position 
was within the organisation as well as the importance of trust in so far as her 
position was concerned, and what operational risk she posed to the 
organisation.193 
 
                                                 




This case clearly spells out the nature of the evidence that is required to be 
presented and by whom, in order to prove the breakdown of the trust relationship 
and thereby substantiate a dismissal.  The case illustrates the following: A 
witness is required to testify in respect of the breakdown in the trust relationship. 
The person who testifies must be a manager or supervisor who deals with the 
employee in the employment context. The manager or supervisor must tell the 
hearing in what way the employee’s conduct breached the trust relationship. It 
would appear that a company’s disciplinary code which only sets out rules and 
does not state what the consequences are for breaches, is not sufficient. 
Chairperson or presiding officer, who are managers within the organisation do 
not represent management when they are chairing disciplinary proceedings. 
Their role is not of a witness but an impartial chairperson who is appointed to 
consider the evidence presented and make a fair decision. Thus the chairperson 
cannot represent management in respect to the impact of the misconduct on the 
trust relationship. 
The Edcon decision does not change the principle that misconduct by an 
employee that undermines the trust and confidence, fundamental to the 
employment relationship will justify the termination of the employment 
relationship.194 However, it is clear from the Edcon decision that a manager or 




The complex jurisprudential issues discussed above provide little assistance to 
employers who want to know when they are entitled to dismiss and if they do 
dismiss for misconduct when is it likely that the decision will be interfered with by 
a commissioner.195 After Sidumo, even if an employer satisfies all the 
requirements of Item 7 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, there will still be 
a possibility that a commissioner may find that dismissal is an inappropriate 
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sanction and therefore unfair.196 The test is now whether a reasonable 
commissioner, with all the relevant information placed before him or her, will 
agree that the sanction of dismissal is fair and therefore an appropriate 
sanction.197 As stated above, the test is no longer that of a reasonable employer. 
The commissioner is required to take a holistic view of the case but the test may 
leave employers in a precarious position of trying to second guess what a 
commissioner may decide if they go ahead and dismiss an employee for 
misconduct.198 
 
CHAPTER 4: RELEVANT FACTORS 
 
This chapter will consider factor that may impact on the severity of a sanction 
that is imposed on an employee who is found guilty of misconduct. These factors 
have no relevance on whether or not an employee is guilty of misconduct but 
play a role on mitigating or aggravating sanction. Presiding officers and 
commissioners are required to consider all relevant factors when determining an 
appropriate sanction for misconduct. 
 
4.1 Provision of the employer’s disciplinary code  
 
A disciplinary code contains the rules and standards of conduct required of 
employees in the workplace. It also contains the procedural step relating to the 
disciplinary process. The nature and content of rules may differ according to the 
size and type of business in question.199 The nature and size of the business 
may also dictate how discipline is applied in the workplace. Smaller entities may 
follow a more informal approach whereas bigger businesses tend to have a more 
formal and structured approach to discipline and their disciplinary hearings at 
times mimic court proceedings. Notwithstanding this, the overriding principle for 
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both approaches is fairness.200 The rules and standards of conduct required from 
employees must be clearly communicated to them in a manner that they 
understand. In order for employers to discharge their obligation of ensuring 
procedural and substantive fairness, employees need to be aware of the 
standards of conduct required in the workplace and the procedures that can be 
invoked. The existence of a disciplinary code is therefore preferable as this will 
ensure that the procedure and rules to be followed are clearly outlined and they 
must also be communicated to all employees in a manner and form that they 
understand. However, employees can also be disciplined for rules not specifically 
contained in the disciplinary code if the rule is obvious or the employee ought to 
know that that was an unwritten rule within the sector. 
 
The case of Transvaal Mattress & Furnishing Company Ltd v CCMA & others,201 
involved an employee who had been dismissed for unauthorised use of a 
company vehicle. The commissioner found that the dismissal was unfair and 
reinstated the employee. On review the LAC held that the commissioner was 
correct when he concluded that the employer had not properly communicated the 
consequences of non-compliance with the rule against unauthorised use of 
company vehicles, to its employees.202 Employees must be made aware of the 
rules that the employer regards as severe, unless this is obvious. 
 
 The existence of a disciplinary code within a workplace is not mandatory.203 If 
one does not exist then the provisions of the Code of Good Practice need to be 
complied with.204 Even if an employer does have a disciplinary code then that 
code needs to be consistent with the provisions of the Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal. The fairness of a disciplinary code is assessed against the general 
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requirements of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal contained in Schedule 8 of 
the LRA. The Code is a guideline on the important aspects of dismissal for 
misconduct and incapacity as well as the correct procedures to follow.205 
Disciplinary codes and procedures in the workplace need to be in line with the 
provisions of the Code.  
 
Certain disciplinary codes specify particular sanctions for certain types of 
misconduct.206 This enhances the application of consistency with respect to 
disciplinary transgressions. However, the fairness of disciplinary codes must still 
meet the yardstick of fairness set by the Code.  Disciplinary codes are not 
inflexible documents and are regarded as guidelines and are directive in 
nature.207 Employers may depart from the specified sanction in particular cases 
where the misconduct was extreme.208 However, as a general rule employers 
must follow the sanctions stipulated in their disciplinary code.209 Should an 
employer want to impose a harsher sanction for particular misconduct in the 
future, then this must be communicated to all employees up front.210 Disciplinary 
codes should always embrace the notion of corrective and progressive discipline 
and avoid being punitive from the onset.211  
 
4.2 Nature and gravity of the offence 
 
The severity of the offence is generally informed by the nature of the misconduct 
and the circumstances in which it was committed. To warrant dismissal, the 
misconduct must be so severe that it renders the continued employment 
relationship intolerable. Item 3(4) of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal gives 
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the following examples of serious misconduct, namely ‘gross dishonesty or willful 
damage to the property of the employer, willful endangering of the safety of 
others, physical assault on the employer, a fellow employee, client or customer 
or gross insubordination.’ These are merely examples of misconduct which will 
usually be regarded as sufficiently serious to justify dismissal. The list is however 
not exhaustive and is subject to the requirement that each case must be judged 
on its own merits.212 The mere fact that an instance of misconduct falls in the 
category of serious misconduct is not carte blanche for an employer to 
automatically impose a sanction of dismissal. An employer must still consider 
mitigating factors and the possibility of imposing a lesser sanction.213 Over and 
above the examples provided in the Code, the courts have found that dismissal is 
an appropriate sanction for a host of other transgressions such as racial 
abuse,214 sexual harassment,215 unauthorised possession of company 
property216 and conflict of interests,217 to name but a few. 
 
Further, relatively minor transgressions may be considered in a serious light if 
they are repeat offences and progressive discipline has failed. Infractions which 
are usually regarded as minor may also be more serious as a result of the 
circumstances in which they were committed. For example, an employee who 
smokes in a factory that contains flammable products may be dismissed for a 
first offence whilst a secretary who works in the administration section of a 
company may receive a written warning for the first offence.218 It is also important 
to note that progressive and corrective discipline will generally not be appropriate 
for offences that destroy the trust relationship, such as acts of dishonesty.219 
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4.2.1 Specific examples considered 
 
This work will briefly consider two types of misconduct, namely acts of dishonesty 
and negligence. Dishonesty is an intentional based act or omission whilst 
negligence is one that is based on the failure to perform to the standard of the 




Dishonesty in the employment context is a ‘generic term’ covering all intentional 
acts or omissions involving deception.220 However, in the workplace dishonest 
conduct does not have to constitute a criminal offence where all the elements of 
the crime would need to be proven.221  Dishonesty in the workplace would 
include theft, fraud, corruption, misappropriation of money or goods, bribery, 
failing to account for funds, amongst others.222 Obviously intention plays a role in 
conduct of this nature.  The LAC has taken a very strict approach to dishonest 
conduct and has found that dishonest conduct will generally have the ‘effect of 
rendering the relationship of the employer and employee intolerable,’ and will 
thus justify dismissal regardless of the length of service or previous clean 
disciplinary record of the employee.223 The requirement of ‘intolerability’ has also 
been codified in item 3(4) of the Code. Further, the Code specifically mentions 
gross dishonesty as a possible dismissal offence. Therefore the legislature 
contemplated gross dishonest conduct as a fair reason to dismiss, even for a first 
offence. The only leniency shown by the courts in respect of dishonest conduct is 
where the conduct does not pose an operational risk to the employer. This would 
be for example where the dishonesty constituted a ‘forgivable white lie’ or was 
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regarded as ‘foolish’. In such cases the dishonest conduct would not be regarded 
as gross.224 
 
Theft is clearly an offence involving dishonesty. Historically, the industrial courts 
drew a distinction between theft and petty theft (petty pilfering) and required that 
a ‘thieving propensity’ was required to be proven on the part of the employee in 
order for the conduct in question to justify dismissal.225  However, this distinction 
was rejected by the LAC in Anglo American Farms Boschendal Restaurants v 
Komjwayo,226 where it was held that the test was whether the employee’s 
conduct had rendered the continued employment relationship intolerable.227  
Further, the court held that there are no degrees to theft and that it would be 
impractical to attempt to draw distinctions between ‘degrees’ of theft. Therefore, 
the value of an item stolen is generally deemed immaterial.228 However, the 
courts have been somewhat more lenient where the goods in question are 
destined for disposal or are no longer of economic value.229 For example, in the 
case of Simba Quix Ltd v Rampersad & another,230 the court held that the 
dismissal of an employee was unfair because the employer had not established a 
clear rule that employees were not authorised to remove the allegedly stolen 
goods and where the goods held no economic value for the employer.  
 
Dishonesty is not confined to conduct in which the employee enriches him or 
herself at the expense of the employer but also includes any instances in which 
the employee intentional deceives the employer.231 This would include 
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falsification of documents such as attendance registers or making a false 
statement to a supervisor in order for an employee to cover up his whereabouts.  
 
Although gross dishonesty is specifically mentioned in the Code as a form of 
serious misconduct, the employer is still obliged to consider an employee’s 
personal circumstances, the nature of job and circumstances surrounding the 
transgression before deciding on the appropriate sanction. This would include 
considering length of service, previous disciplinary record and personal 
circumstances.232  
 
What follows is a discussion of cases involving the determination of the 
appropriateness of the sanction of dismissal in cases involving dishonesty.  
 
In Miyambo v CCMA & Others (2010) 31 ILJ 2031 (LAC) the employee took 
scrap metal without authority. His representative argued that there should be a 
distinction between theft in the ‘technical sense’ and theft in the ‘strict sense’. 
However, the court held that there are no degrees to theft and that it would be 
impractical to do so.  The employee in this case had 25 years service and a 
clean disciplinary record. The court followed a strict approach to dishonest 
conduct in the workplace and held that dismissal was fair based on the 
employer’s operational requirements. The court followed the approach adopted in 
De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & Others (2009) 9 BLLR 995 (LAC) 
and Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others (2008) BLLR 838 (LAC) and 
stated as follows at paragraph 13: 
 
 “It is appropriate to pause and reflect on the role that trust plays in the 
employment relationship. Business risk is predominantly based on the 
trustworthiness of company employees. The accumulation of individual 
breaches of trust has significant economic repercussions. A successful 
business enterprise operates on the basis of trust.” 
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In Rainbow Farms (Pty) Ltd v CCMA,233 the court held that an employee who had 
removed ‘free issue’ milk without authority (there was a strict rule prohibiting this 
conduct) had destroyed the trust relationship and therefore dismissal was an 
appropriate sanction. In Komane v Fedsure Life,234  it was held that theft of a 
packet of powdered milk justified dismissal. In Fiphaza / Overine 47 CC t/a Mugg 
& Bean Stellenbosch Square,235 the employee was dismissed for consuming a 
piece of ‘crispy’ bacon. The commissioner found that the dismissal was fair as 
there was a clear rule prohibiting the eating of food in the kitchen, whether 
spoiled or not. Employees had also been repeatedly warned that this conduct 
amounted to theft. The commissioner also stated that although the sanction may 
appear harsh, this was outweighed by the employer’s need to protect its 
business interests and that the conduct had, under the circumstances, breached 
the trust relationship.  
 
With respect to misrepresentations, the courts have also held that employees 
who make a misrepresentation (ie: making false statements / lying) about their 
qualifications or previous conduct are deserving of dismissal, even if this is 
discovered at a later stage.236 However, the courts have held that not all lies are 
severe enough to warrant a sanction of dismissal. The determination of an 
appropriate sanction is therefore dependant on the merits of the particular case. 
 
In Ehrke v Standard Bank of SA & Others,237 the applicant was employed as a 
home loans consultant. Due to under performance he was placed on a 
performance improvement program (PIP) and was also required to attend a one 
week training course. Whilst on the course the applicant received a voice 
message on his cell phone from a co-worker, to the effect that she was going to 
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complain about him to management. The co-worker had been informed by 
another bank employee that her application to open a bank account had been 
declined (the applicant was the one who was handling the matter and therefore 
she blamed him for her application being declined). Although the applicant was 
not at fault, he nevertheless arranged to meet with the co-worker at a time he 
knew he was meant to attend a function regarding the PIP. To cover up his 
absence from the function he lied to management by informing them that he was 
urgently attending to a client’s account application. When he was later called to a 
meeting to explain his absence from the function he persisted with the lie. 
However, later the applicant decided to clear his conscience and informed 
management that he had lied to them. 
 
The applicant was charged with dishonesty and called to a disciplinary hearing to 
account for ‘deliberately giving untrue, misleading or wrong information’ as per 
the company’s disciplinary code (this was listed as dismissible conduct). The 
applicant was found guilty, dismissed and his name was blacklisted on the 
interbank register of employees dismissed (RED). The applicant challenged the 
dismissal as unfair and referred the matter to the CCMA. The commissioner held 
that the dismissal was substantively fair. The applicant then approached the LC. 
 
On review, the LC (per Zilwa AJ) set the arbitration award aside. The court held 
that it was ‘baseless fear and panic’ on the part of the applicant that caused him 
to tell the lie in question (ie: he was under the mistaken impression that he could 
possibly lose his job if there was a complaint against him, as he was already on a 
performance improvement plan). The lie and conduct of the applicant did not 
prejudice the respondent in any material way. Although the respondent’s 
disciplinary code specified dishonest conduct, which included ‘deliberately giving 
untrue, misleading or wrong information’ as dismissible, certain lies may well be 
given for an ‘understandable or forgivable reason’, and do not really break the 
trust relationship. These fall into the category of ‘white lies’. Considering the 
matter in its entirety, ie: the importance of the rule, the reason for dismissal, the 
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harm caused by the employee’s conduct, other possible remedial action, the 
court found that no reasonable decision maker, with the material placed before 
him or her, would have concluded that the dismissal was substantively fair.238 
Finally, no evidence was led by the respondent at the arbitration to prove that the 
trust relationship had irretrievably broken down, thereby justifying a sanction of 
dismissal.239 
 
In Timonthy v Nampak Corrugated Containers,240 an employee tried to assist a 
colleague by obtaining information on the balance of a garnishee order. The 
employee phoned the law firm administering the order and made out that he was 
an attorney representing the company, and as such required the information. He 
also became very abusive towards the collections clerk. The collections clerk 
became suspicious and requested the name of the firm and the telephone 
number. When the collections clerk noticed that the telephone number that was 
provided was in fact that of the company, she complained about the employee’s 
conduct. The employee was dismissed. A CCMA commissioner found that the 
sanction was too harsh as the employee was merely attempting to help a 
colleague. The LAC held that this was not a ‘reasonable decision’ as the 
company’s name and image had been tarnished and the employee had also 
contravened the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979. Further, he had ‘compounded his 
dishonesty’ by being abusive to the collections clerk and had shown no remorse. 
Dismissal was confirmed as an appropriate sanction.   
 
However, in Nedcor Bank v Frank,241 the LAC held that employees who had 
disengaged the card reader of an ATM at Durban Airport that had run out of cash 
(and thereby made it to appear to be working), in order to shield the bank from 
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the wrath of airport management had not acted dishonestly.  The court held as 
follows242:  
 
“Dishonesty entails a lack of integrity or straightforwardness and, in 
particular, a willingness to steal, cheat, lie or act fraudulently (see Toyota 
SA Motors (Pty) v Radebe & others (2000) 21 ILJ 340 (LAC) at 345 F–H; 
R v Brown 1908 TS 21; R v White 1968 (3) SA 556 (RAD); Ex parte 
Bennett 1978 (2) SA 380 (W) at 383H-384C; S v Manqina; S v Madinda 
1996 (1) SACR 258 (E) at 260 e-h and the Oxford Dictionary). In the 
Canadian case of Lynch & Co v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co 
[1971] 1 OR 28 at 37, 38, Ont SC, the following was said: (per Fraser J): 
 
 ‘Dishonesty is normally used to describe an act where there has been 
some intent to deceive or cheat. To use it to describe acts which are 
merely reckless, disobedient or foolish is not in accordance with popular 
usage or the dictionary definition.’ 
 
Certainly, insofar as the appellant or its customers are concerned, no 
intention to steal, cheat, lie or act fraudulently is manifest. And what of the 
intention to conceal the true state of affairs from management of the 
airport? That is not covered by the charge. In any event it is, to my mind, 
impossible for the appellant to claim that as a result of the first and second 
respondents’ conduct the relationship of trust between them and the 
appellant has been destroyed.” 
 
In Edcon v Pillemer,243 the employee was dismissed for breaching the trust 
relationship by failing to report an accident that her son had had in the company 
vehicle. She had in fact repaired the vehicle at her husband’s panel beating 
workshop at her own cost. The employer found out about this some six months 
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later and confronted the employee who initially denied that the vehicle had been 
involved in an accident and that her son was driving the vehicle. She 
subsequently recanted and admitted to the incident but still told untruths as to 
where and how the accident occurred. A CCMA commissioner found the 
dismissal substantively unfair as no evidence was led as to whether the trust 
relationship had broken down. The commissioner also took into account the 
applicant’s clean record of 17 years as well as the fact that the applicant was 2 
years away from retirement. The SCA, using the test in Sidumo,244 held that the 
dismissal was substantively unfair. The case of Edcon v Pillemer,245 also 
involved dishonest conduct in respect of making false statements or lying. In this 
case the court did not equate the lies to a ‘white lie’. However, a defective 
disciplinary charge sheet246, length of service and a clean record coupled to the 
employer’s failure to lead evidence to prove that the trust relationship had 
irretrievably broken down, probably saved the employee. It is worth noting that 
the company argued that the employee had persisted in lying during the 
investigation, but the court did not accept this, as this should have been 
‘specifically alleged’ in the charge sheet so that the employee could appreciate 
the ‘real nature of the charges’247 and respond accordingly.  
 
In Westonaria Local Municipality v SALGBC,248 the court went on to accept that 
generally dishonesty renders the employment relationship intolerable and 
irreconcilable. However the court also accepted that not every act of dishonesty 
will justify dismissal.249 The court went on to state that the duty to prove that the 
trust relationship between the parties has broken down as a consequence of 
serious misconduct vests with the employer.250 The court referred to the case of 
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Edcon Ltd v Pillemer,251 where the commissioner had found that dismissal was 
unfair in a case involving dishonest conduct (misrepresentation) because there 
was no evidence before her that could prove that the trust relationship had 
irretrievably broken down.  
 
In De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & others,252 the learned judge had 
the following to state in respect to fraudulent conduct: 
 
‘The commissioner characterised the misconduct as serious. Despite that, 
she concluded that the relationship of trust between the appellant and the 
employee had not broken down. Where an employee has committed a 
serious fraud one might reasonably conclude that the relationship of trust 
between him or her and the employer has been destroyed. When the 
employer then asserts that this has in fact happened, it would be startling 
to hear a commissioner proclaim that, despite what one might expect and 
despite what the employer says in fact occurred, the relationship of trust 
has not broken down.’253 
 
The learned judge in De Beers Consolidated Mines254 went on to state that a 
commissioner is not bound to agree with the employer’s assessment of the 
damage caused to the trust relationship due to the misconduct committed by the 
employee. However, in cases of fraud only extraordinary circumstances would 
‘warrant a conclusion’ that the relationship could be restored.  
 
In Department of Health, Eastern Province v PHWSBC & others,255 an employee 
fraudulently completed forms making out that he had been interviewed and 
recommended for appointment to a promotional post. When the transgression 
was uncovered he was charged with misconduct and summoned to a disciplinary 
                                                 
251 Supra 
252 (2000) 21 ILJ 1051 (LAC) at para 17 
253 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & others, supra at para 23 
254 Supra 
255 [2009] 2 BLLR 131 (LC) 
 59
hearing. The employee pleaded guilty to the charge, showed remorse and also 
indicated that he had acted out of desperation as he acted in a higher post for a 
number of years and his efforts had not been recognised by the employer. The 
applicant was nevertheless dismissed, however he remained in service for 
approximately a year pending the finalisation of his internal appeal. The 
employee lodged an unfair dismissal dispute and the arbitrator found that the 
dismissal was too severe under the circumstances as the employee had acted in 
a higher post for some time without compensation and in all fairness should have 
been promoted. The employee was re – instated with retrospective effect.  
 
On review the LC could not fault the findings of the commissioner. The court 
noted that the employee had long service, some 23 years and that the employer 
had suffered no loss. Further, the employee whilst in service had referred an 
unfair labour practice dispute to the CCMA regarding the fact that he had acted in 
a higher post for a number of years, and the commissioner ordered the 
department to advertise the post which they failed to do. The employee also 
remained in service for a year pending the finalisation of his appeal. The 
commissioner had considered all these factors and accordingly the LC found no 
basis to interfere with the award. 
 
The case of Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others,256 requires special 
consideration. This case gives insight into the LAC determination of the fairness 
of the sanction of dismissal.   
 
The facts of the case are as follows: The employee was an assistant baker with 
nine years service and a clean service record. He was dismissed after being 
caught on camera eating ‘pap’ on two days and a slice of bread on another day. 
Having found that the commissioner’s ruling that the employee was not guilty of 
misconduct was reviewable the court went on itself to determine the fairness of 
                                                 
256 (2008) 29 ILJ 2581 (LAC). Compare with Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others [2008] 12 BLLR 1211 (LAC) 
overturned in part in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others (2009) 30 ILJ 829 (SCA) at para 24 
 60
the sanction of dismissal. The court considered the body of jurisprudence in 
which dismissal of employees with long service for theft of items of small value, 
were upheld.257 The court held that the employee had breached rules on a 
number of occasions and acted in blatant disregard of company rules that had 
been implemented for justifiable operational reasons. The employer had acted 
consistently in its application of discipline and had dismissed other employees 
who had committed similar offences. The company was experiencing high 
shrinkage levels for which the employee was the cause, which it could not afford 
and because of the nature of his job, which was the preparation of food, they 
could not afford to have him back in his position as his conduct had destroyed 
the trust relationship. With respect to the latter point, there was unchallenged 
evidence presented to this effect during the disciplinary hearing. The court held 
that dismissal was a fair sanction.258 
 
This case highlights the following. It remains the employer’s prerogative to set 
rules and standards of conduct in terms of its operational requirements.259 Case 
law remains an important factor in determining the fairness of the sanction of 
dismissal.260 It confirms that theft justifies dismissal regardless of the value of the 
item and length of service.261 The court held that the following factors constitute 
aggravating factors – the misconduct constituted dishonesty, there was no 
remorse, the misconduct related to the nature of the job, the problem of 
shrinkage had been identified by the employer and communicated to all within 
the business and dismissal had been consistently applied for this type of 
transgression.262 Convincing evidence must be led on the breakdown of the trust 
relationship.263 
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Notwithstanding, some indulgence granted in some cases involving dishonest 
misrepresentation the usual natural consequences of dishonest conduct is that of 
dismissal. In this regard, it has been long established that any conduct on the 
part of an employee that is incompatible with the trust and confidence, necessary 
for the continuation of the employment relations will entitle the employer to bring 
the relationship to an end.264 In summary, it is generally accepted that theft 
(which breaks the trust relationship) justifies dismissal, regardless of the value of 
the item involved. It is also justified in order to deter other theft in the workplace 
and for operational reasons.265 Even length of service and a clean disciplinary 




Negligence is tantamount to carelessness.267 In other words, it is an objective 
standard based on the ‘failure to exercise the degree of care expected of a 
reasonable person.’268 In the workplace, this is correlated to that of a reasonable 
employee with the ‘experience, skill and qualifications comparable to the accused 
employee’ and whether that employee ‘would have foreseen the possibility of 
harm and taken steps to avoid that harm’.269 If the negligent act or omission did 
not actually cause harm, an employee can still be disciplined for his or her 
negligent conduct as it had the potential to cause harm or prejudice the 
organisation.270 Intentional conduct is invariably more serious than negligent 
conduct and therefore negligent conduct would usually warrant corrective 
disciplinary action for a first offence.271 However, negligent conduct that 
endangers lives and safety may warrant a more severe sanction, for a first 
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offence, even including dismissal. Further, in very senior managerial positions 
with high levels of skill where a ‘drop of a pen’ may have significant 
consequences, negligence will be dealt with severely.272 It is important to note 
that negligently performed work is also work performed poorly and to this extent it 
overlaps with the incapacity provisions in the Code.273 
 
4.3 Nature of business and operational requirements 
 
The gravity of misconduct must always be weighed against other relevant factors 
relating to the employee, which for instance may include remorse, length of 
service and disciplinary record. However, the impact of the misconduct must also 
be considered in relation to the harm it caused to the employer’s business (this 
would include the future harm if it is repeated).  This after all is part of risk 
management. 
 
In De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & Others,274 the Court, per 
Conradie JA, held the following regarding risk management:  
 
“Dismissal is not an expression of moral outrage; much less is it an act of 
vengeance. It is, or should be, a sensible operational response to risk 
management in a particular enterprise. That is why supermarket shelf 
packers who steal small items are routinely dismissed. Their dismissal has 
little to do with society’s moral opprobrium of a minor theft; it has 
everything to do with the operational requirements of the employer’s 
enterprise.”275 
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Mutual Construction Company Tvl (Pty) Ltd v Ntombela NO & Others,276 dealt 
with a review application regarding an unfair dismissal dispute.  In this case the 
Commissioner found that the dismissal was unfair as the employer failed to prove 
that the employee intended to commit fraud and failed to produce the time sheets 
at the disciplinary hearing.  However, the LAC found that there was clear 
evidence that the employee had committed an act of gross dishonesty by 
falsifying his time sheets and was therefore a fair reason to justify dismissal.277  
The court held that the Commissioner failed to take the totality of circumstances 
into account when making a decision. As an administration clerk who recorded 
employees working hours he occupied a position of responsibility and trust.278 He 
was an operational risk and his conduct caused harm and prejudice to the 
employer and was potentially prejudicial if he was reinstated to his position as he 
could continue to falsify his and other employees’ time sheets.279  The employee 
showed a lack of remorse and attempted to shift the blame to the site manager 
who signed off on the falsified time sheet. The employee also had relatively short 
service, namely two and a half years.280 The court found that for the employer to 
retain the employee under the circumstances would be inappropriate and 
detrimental to the employer’s operational requirements. The court further held 
that the employee’s conduct had rendered the continued employment 
relationship intolerable. The court referring to Conradie JA in De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Ltd,281 stated that: 
 
‘Where an employee has committed a serious fraud one might reasonably 
conclude that the relationship of trust between him and the employer has 
been destroyed.’282 (at 1057C-D) 
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In BEMAWU obo Pathers & others and SABC,283 the commissioner who was 
dealing with a dismissal dispute relating to a misconduct involving elements of 
dishonesty wherein the employees were also manipulated by a colleague, found 
that the dismissal was too harsh as the employees had impeccable disciplinary 
records and long service and they also did not appreciate that their conduct could 
destroy the employment relationship. The commissioner also found that after 
balancing the actions of the employees against the harm caused to the employer 
that dismissal was not a fair sanction.284 In this case the operational risk did not 
tilt the scale against clean record, long service and appreciation of wrongfulness.  
 
It is clear that conduct that poses an operational risk or potential operational risk 
to an employer’s business interests justifies dismissal. However, the totality of 
circumstances needs to be taken into account in deciding on an appropriate 
sanction. 
 
4.4 Principles of corrective and progressive discipline 
 
The primary purpose of disciplinary action is to correct wrongful behaviour 
through a graduated process of warnings. This usually commences with a verbal 
warning through to a final written warning. The idea is to correct wrongful 
behaviour through the issuing of warnings and progress to more severe warnings 
should the conduct persist. This will depend on the merits of the particular case 
and there is no requirement that an employer must start with a verbal warning. 
The starting point is informed by the nature of the misconduct committed. 
 
In Timothy v Nampak Corrugated Containers,285 the following was stated in 
regard to progressive discipline: 
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‘…The idea of a progressive sanction is to ensure that an employee can 
be reintegrated into the embrace of the employer’s organisation, in 
circumstances where the employment relationship can be restored to that 
which pertained prior to the misconduct.’ 
 
The case of Cadbury, SA (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration and others,286 dealt with the application of corrective and progressive 
discipline. The court stated the following in respect to an employee who was 
found to have committed a second act of insubordination: 
 
‘I have considered the evidence in mitigation especially her length of 
services of twenty one years. I am, however, of the view that the gravity of 
the misconduct she made herself guilty of and the fact that she was on a 
final written warning for similar misconduct out-weighed misconduct by far. 
Her dismissal was appropriate.’287 
 
The Code supports a corrective and progressive approach to misconduct.288 An 
employee’s behaviour is corrected through interventions that become 
progressively more severe. Minor transgressions are dealt with through informal 
advice and counselling. If the conduct is repeated then the employee should be 
given warnings which may be graduated in terms of the severity of the 
misconduct.289 More serious offences or repeated misconduct may warrant a 
final written warning or other disciplinary action short of dismissal (this may 
include a demotion or suspension without pay).290 Dismissal is reserved for 
serious misconduct or repeat offences where progressive discipline has failed.291 
Should a court find that previous warnings that were issued were defective or 
unjustifiably issued then those warnings cannot be relied upon to justify a 
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sanction of dismissal in relation to the case at hand.292 Further, employees who 
are on final written warnings need to be aware of the severity and consequences 
of these corrective sanctions should they transgress again. In Seardel Group 
Trading (Pty) Ltd t/a Cape Underwear Manufacturers v SACTWU & others,293 the 
LAC stated the following in respect to repetitive misconduct: 
 
 ‘The employees made themselves guilty of such misconduct when they 
were still on a final written warning for going on an illegal strike within the 
previous twelve months. This was very serious and the employees were 
lucky that the court a quo did not find that their dismissal was fair’294 
 
Item 3(2) of the Code endorses the concept of a graduated system of disciplinary 
action that attempts to correct employees’ behaviour, through counselling and 
warnings. This system is progressive in nature whereby the issuing of different 
levels of warnings is encouraged and dismissal is reserved for serious 
misconduct or repeated offences.295 Obviously dismissal should not be applied if 
a lesser sanction would serve the purpose.296 One of the fundamental purposes 
of disciplinary action is to correct behaviour and rehabilitate offenders so that 
they can continue to play a meaningful role within the organisation.297 This 
rehabilitative approach is akin to sentencing in the criminal law system where the 
rehabilitation of offenders is encouraged and when this is no longer feasible, 
extreme penalties such as life imprisonment or the death sentence is imposed.298 
However, the analogy between discipline in the labour context, and the criminal 
justice system is limited, as the employer has no inherent right to punish 
employees. The employer’s right to dismiss employees is contractual and labour 
law ensures that the employer exercises its right to terminate the contract for 
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breaches, fairly.299 However, it is trite that the sanction must ‘fit the 
misconduct’.300 
 
Further, in the disciplinary context an employer has a limited range of permissible 
sanctions to apply and this somewhat constrains the extent of the application of 
progressive discipline.301 These sanctions are warnings, demotion, suspension 
without pay and dismissal.  
 
The employer’s need to discipline employees is regarded as an operational 
response to risk management.302 However, the misconduct must have a severe 
effect on the business operations and therefore make progressive discipline 
inappropriate.303 Generally employees are dismissed as they are no longer 
trusted and also to deter others from committing serious misconduct.304 Although 
each case should be judged on its own merits, an employer must also be 
consistent in the application of discipline and sanctions imposed. Imposing a 
lessor sanction when it is not justified will cause an inconsistency problem for the 
employer and may have an adverse impact on substantive fairness.   
 
This test is premised on the contractual relationship between the parties and 
whether, due to the conduct of the employee, the employer can reasonably be 
expected to continue with the relationship. In other words, it deals with the effect 
that the employee’s misconduct has had on the employment relationship.305 The 
courts have dealt with this in different ways and have considered whether the 
‘trust’ relationship has been destroyed or whether the employment relationship 
has been rendered ‘intolerable’ or ‘futile’.306 This is also supported by item 3(4) of 
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the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal which states that ‘dismissal will only be 
appropriate for a first offence if the misconduct is serious and of such gravity that 
it makes the continued employment relationship intolerable’. In this regard, the 
employer must lead actual evidence that the employment relationship has 
irreparably broken down unless this is obvious from the circumstances of the 
case.307 If a lesser sanction would sever the same purpose than a harsher one 
then the lesser sanction should be applied as long as it would not have an 
adverse effect on risk management. But an employer must also be mindful of the 
parity principle. 
 
4.5 Personal circumstances of the employee 
 
There is little certainty as to the extent that an employer must take the personal 
circumstances of an employee into account when deciding on an appropriate 
sanction. Besides length of service and other mitigating factors it is not clear 
what personal circumstances should be considered, if any.308 After all dismissal 
affects not only the employee but his or her entire family as well. It also affects 
employees themselves in different ways. For instances older employees may find 
it difficult to find alternative employment, whilst young unattached employees 
may be less affected by a dismissal.309 A dismissal of a professional person may 
affect his or her professional reputation and his or her future employability within 
the particular industry whilst a general worker may be less affected in so far as 
professional reputation is concerned.310  
 
Obviously employers are at liberty to consider the personal circumstances of 
employees when deciding on an appropriate sanction. However, should an 
employer take factors such as future employability (due to being elderly) or being 
a sole bread winner into account they should do so with caution, as any leniency 
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shown in this regard may impact on consistency in so far as future similar 
offences are concerned.311 It is also doubtful that an otherwise fair dismissal will 
be deemed to be unfair based on these grounds alone.312  
 
4.5.1 Length of service 
 
Generally the greater the length of service the more thoroughly an employer 
must apply his or her mind to mitigating factors. The converse is also true. The 
shorter the years of service, the stronger other mitigating factors will have to be 
to save an employee from dismissal.313 An employee’s length of service is 
indicative of his or her reliability and commitment to the organisation. It is also 
relevant in determining whether an employee is likely to commit the offence 
again.314 Length of service impacts on an employee’s future reliability however it 
cannot on its own render a dismissal unfair.315 Length of service coupled with 
loyal and faithful service may persuade an employer to accept the risk of 
continuing with the employment relationship even though he or she is now aware 
that the employee has committed misconduct.316 However, length of service will 
have little relevance in cases involving serious misconduct.317 
 
An example of a case in which length of service was not considered sufficient to 
render an employee’s dismissal unfair is Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & 
others318  In this case the court stated the following: 
 
‘Although a long period of service of an employee will usually be a 
mitigating factor where such employee is guilty of misconduct, the point 
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must be made that there are certain acts of misconduct which are of such 
a serious nature that no length of service can save an employee who is 
guilty of them from dismissal. To my mind one such clear act of 
misconduct is gross dishonesty. It appears to me that the Commissioner 
did not appreciate this fundamental point. 
 
I hold that the first respondent’s length of service in the circumstances of 
this case was of no relevance and could not provide, and should not 
provide, any mitigation for misconduct of such a serious nature such as 
gross dishonesty. I am not saying that there can be no sufficient mitigating 
factors in cases of dishonesty nor am I saying dismissal is always 
appropriate sanction for misconduct involving dishonesty. In my judgment 
the moment dishonesty is accepted in a particular case as being of such a 
degree as to be described as gross, then dismissal in an appropriate and 
fair sanction.’ (at 344C-F)319 
 
 
4.6 Consistency / The Parity principle 
 
Generally, employers are required to apply the same standards to employees 
when implementing discipline in the workplace. Therefore, if two employees have 
committed the same transgression and the two cases are indistinguishable then 
both employees should receive the same sanction.320 Being consistent is part of 
the requirement of acting fairly. Just as employees are required to be aware of 
the rules within the workplace, so too is the employer is required to enforce them 
consistently.321 The inconsistent enforcement of rules creates confusion amongst 
employees in so far as the standard of conduct required of them in the workplace 
is concerned. It also creates uncertainty in respect of whether the rule still exists 
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or is being taken seriously by the employer.322 The Code requires an employer to 
act consistently when applying discipline especially in cases involving 
dismissal.323 The employer must be apply the same sanction to employees as it 
has done in the past for commission of the same offence (historical consistency) 
as well as between a number employees who are involved in the commission of 
the same or similar offence at more or less the same time (contemporaneous 
consistency).324 Obviously if the cases are distinguishable then an employer is 
entitled to apply different sanctions. Consistency is required as regards to the 
sanction imposed as well as in the application of discipline for breach of a rule. It 
would be inconsistent to discipline some employees for breaching the rule whilst 
turning a blind eye to others who transgress or to dismiss some employees for 
committing a particular offence and not others.325 Item 5 of the Code requires 
employers to keep disciplinary record for each employee, indicating the offence 
committed, the consequent disciplinary action taken by the employer and the 
reason the employer took that action. 
 
It should be noted that the employer is also required to ‘consider factors such as 
the employee’s circumstances, nature of the job and the circumstances of the 
infringement.’326 Consistency is premised on treating ‘like cases alike’ this is a 
requirement of fairness.327Therefore an employer may well be justified in 
distinguishing between two employees guilty of the same offence due to their 
differing personal circumstances (length of service and disciplinary record) or the 
differing roles they played in the commission of the offence.328 Further, should an 
employer be lax in enforcing rules or be overly lenient with respect to sanction 
and later on decides to adopt a strict approach, it must clearly inform employees 
of the new approach to discipline to avoid being accused of historical 
inconsistency. 
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In Minister of Correctional Services v Mthembu NO,329 the court held in respect of 
the consistency of sanction that the ‘parity principle’ should not be applied 
inflexibly and that assessing the fairness of a dismissal involves a ‘moral or 
value’ judgment. In SACCAWU & others v Irvin & Johnson Ltd,330 the court held 
that although employees should be measured by the same standards, the ‘parity 
principle’ is not in itself a separate principle buts is an element of disciplinary 
fairness. The court went on to note that selective discipline may be unfair but 
notwithstanding this, if some employees who committed serious misconduct are 
not dismissed, even for improper motives, this does not mean that the other 
employees will necessarily escape dismissal. Some inconsistency is the 
inevitable result of flexibility, which entails the application of discretion in respect 
to each individual case. The determination of fairness is after all a value 
judgment. It is self evident that not all inconsistency is necessarily unfair.331 
 
If an employer treats a group of employees differently for committing the same 
offence, then the employer must show good cause or be able to justify the 
differentiation. For example, it may be shown that the dismissed employees 
conducted themselves in a more culpable manner then the other employees who 
were not dismissed.332The opposite is also true, if the comparator misconduct is 
less serious or different in nature to the employee who has been dismissed, then 
the inconsistency challenge will fail.333 Likewise if the personal circumstances of 
the employees involved in the misconduct were vastly different. 
 
An example of a case where a dismissal was found to be unfair for inconsistency 
can be found in the case of SRV Mills Services (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others.334 
This case dealt with contemporaneous inconsistency wherein two employees 
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who were absent from duty were treated differently. The following day they 
claimed that the car they were travelling in had broken done. When this was 
found to be untrue one employee was disciplined and dismissed. The disciplinary 
hearing for the other employee was held some time later and he was found not 
guilty. This was held to be unfair as the employer failed to justify the 
differentiation. This case is distinguishable from the case of SACCAWU v Irvin & 
Johnson (Pty) Ltd,335 since in the latter case, the employer gave a satisfactory 
explanation for the differentiation in treatment. The principle established by the 
case is thus that the employer must prove that there was an objective basis for 
applying different sanctions to employees who commit the same misconduct.336 
 
Dismissals will also be held to be unfair on the basis of inconsistency where the 
employer selects employees for dismissal on the basis of irrelevant prior 
warnings and gives the other employees a lesser sanction, when they were all 
involved in the same misconduct.337 In SACTWU & others v Novel Spinners (Pty) 
Ltd,338 the court held that it would be unfair to utilise prior warnings  for individual 
misconduct in a case involving collective misconduct (a stayaway).339 Lapsed or 
expired warnings also cannot be used for differentiation in treatment in group 
misconduct.340 
 
In inconsistency challenges the case being relied upon must be sufficiently 
similar to the case at hand. It is not only the similarities in the conduct that is 
relevant. It must be borne in mind that similar cases can be distinguished on the 
basis of factors such as personal circumstances, length of service, clean 
disciplinary record and remorse shown. It must also be remembered that if an 
employer intends to apply discipline more severely in future then this must be 
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clearly communicated to all employees to avoid accusations of historical 
inconsistency.341  
 
In Westonaria Local Municipality v SALGBC & others,342 the employee was 
dismissed some three years after her employment as a personal assistant to the 
executive mayor, as it was uncovered that she did not have a matriculation 
qualification, which she claimed to have during her interview. The position she 
occupied was one that required trust. As a consequence thereof she was 
dismissed from service. The arbitrator found her dismissal unfair on the basis of 
inconsistency and reinstated her. The evidence presented had shown that 
another employee had been employed on the basis of a falsified matric certificate 
but was not dismissed as the municipality claimed that they had made a ‘plea 
bargain’ arrangement with this employee to testify against a senior official and 
that a matric certificate was also not a requirement of her post. In both cases of 
misconduct the employees admitted guilt. The LC referred to the LAC decision in 
Gcwensha v CCMA & others,343 where the LAC confirmed its decision in 
SACCAWU & others v Irvin & Johnson Ltd,344 that: 
 
‘’Disciplinary consistency is the hallmark of progressive labour relations 
that every employee must be measured by the same standards…[and 
that]…when comparing employees care should be taken to ensure that 
the gravity of the misconduct is evaluated.’345 
 
The court confirmed that it was the employer’s responsibility to set the standards 
of conduct in the workplace and to apply them consistently. The court pointed out 
that where the employer does not enforce rules within the workplace, this may 
well lead employees to believe that the rules have been changed or that non 
compliance with the rules is no longer regarded as serious enough to warrant 
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dismissal, especially in instances where employees have received lesser 
sanctions for non-compliance with a particular rule.346 
 
In casu, the court found that the dismissal was unfair, taking into account her 
remorse, the fact that she was a good worker and had owned up to the 
misconduct, and taking into account the employer’s inconsistent application of 
discipline. 
 
4.7 Disciplinary record 
 
An employee’s disciplinary record is relevant in so far as future misconduct for 
similar offences is concerned. The disciplinary record is relevant in so far as 
deciding on an appropriate sanction is concerned. This is in line with the notion 
that discipline should be applied in a progressive manner.347 Therefore an 
employee on a final written warning for a particular offence may be regarded as 
‘unrehabilitatable’ should he or she be found guilty of a similar misconduct during 
the tenancy of a valid final written warning. In such a case, dismissal would be 
regarded as an appropriate sanction under the circumstances.348  However, an 
employee’s disciplinary record must also be weighed up against the severity of 
the offence. The opposite also holds true. An employee with a clean disciplinary 
record may call for the application of corrective discipline and leniency.349 
 
The relevance of an employee’s disciplinary record is premised on the principle 
that past warnings must be similar to the offence for which the employee has 
been dismissed350 and the past warnings must still be valid and relatively 
recent.351 
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The period of validity of warnings may be stipulated in the disciplinary code, 
collective agreement or be established by way of workplace practice.352 If the 
code is silent in this regard the period of validity is generally regarded as a period 
between six to twelve months.353 Once the period of validity of warnings has 
expired the employee is regarded as having a clean disciplinary record.354 
 
The general principle is that once a warning has lapsed in terms of the period 
stipulated in the disciplinary code, collective agreement or workplace practice 
then the warning cannot be utilised in aggravation of sanction for future cases of 
misconduct. The employee is deemed to possess a clean disciplinary record.355 
Therefore in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & others,356 the LAC 
held that the commissioner was correct in assessing the case as if the employee 
had a clean disciplinary record as the previous warnings were not valid.   
 
What follows is a discussion of cases concerning the relevance of an employee’s 
disciplinary record in determining the appropriate sanction for misconduct.  
 
In NUMSA obo Selepi / Recyclitt (Pty) Ltd,357 the employee was dismissed for 
threatening and insubordinate conduct. The employee was on a final written 
warning for an indefinite period. A CCMA commissioner found that warnings are 
an essential part of corrective and progressive discipline and to allow ‘indefinite 
warnings’ would impose a disciplinary system that was not part of our law. The 
commissioner found that it would be unfair to utilise this warning in determining 
an appropriate sanction.   
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In Witcher / Hullets Aluminium,358 the employee was dismissed for absenteeism 
and late coming which would not ordinarily attract a sanction of dismissal for a 
first offence. However, the employee had been given a consolidated written 
warning which the employer referred to as a ‘final final warning’ to the effect that 
if he transgressed any workplace rule again he would be dismissed. This was a 
‘catch all’ warning that if the employee breached any workplace rule or standard 
during the tenancy of the consolidated warning his services would be terminated. 
The arbitrator found that if an employee’s general conduct and behaviour 
demonstrates a consistent and blatant disregard for disciplinary rules then a 
consolidated final written warning can be issued as long as the employee is 
made aware that any future breach of a rule will lead to dismissal. An employer 
cannot be expected to have to continuously tolerate ongoing misconduct where 
the employee escapes liability therefore by committing a variety of unrelated 
offences. There comes a point where an employer can fairly indicate to an 
employee that enough is enough and that no further misconduct will be tolerated 
and that any further breaches may result in dismissal.  
 
However, there is a limit to which an employee’s past record can be discarded 
due to the lapsing of previous warnings. In Gcwensha v CCMA & others,359 the 
LAC held that dismissal was a fair sanction due to the fact that an employee had 
a dismal past disciplinary record and had a number of warnings for negligence 
which were no longer valid. However, the principle established in this case is the 
exception rather then the norm. 
 
In Edgars Consolidated Stores v CCMA & others,360 an employee was dismissed 
for gross negligence for leaving a cash drawer unlocked which resulted in R1000 
going missing. He was subsequently reinstated retrospectively by a CCMA 
commissioner. On review the company contended that the commissioner had 
misdirected himself by failing to defer to the employer’s choice of sanction and by 
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finding that progressive discipline was appropriate, considering the nature of its 
operations and the circumstances in which the offence occurred. The court held 
that it was trite that the ‘reasonable employer’ test no longer formed part of our 
law and that there is no closed list of factors that commissioners’ must take into 
account when determining that appropriateness of sanction. The court held that 
the company’s disciplinary code did not provide for dismissal for a first offence for 
this type of transgression but provided for a final written warning. As the 
company had not provided any plausible reason for not following its own 
disciplinary code the commissioner’s decision was found to be correct. The 
employee had eight years’ service and a clean record. 
 
If an employee is not dismissed whilst on a final written warning and issued with 
another final written warning this may indicate that the offence is no longer 
regarded as serious. Should the employer dismiss for the same offence in future 
this may raise a question regarding consistency, as the employee was not 
dismissed previously but merely issued with another written warning. The 
employer’s conduct of issuing final written warnings for repeated offences may 
signal that it does not regard the offence as so serious as to warrant dismissal.361 
The pertinent point here is that employers must be cautious in repeatedly issuing 
so-called ‘final written warnings’ as it may cause inconsistency, uncertainty in the 
workplace and undermines the entire disciplinary process.362 
 
The previous warnings may only be taken into account in deciding on an 
appropriate sanction if the later offence is similar to the previous offence for 
which the employee received the warning. If the previous offence is not similar 
then the dismissal may be deemed unfair.363 This would require a proper 
categorisation of the offence in the real sense.364 This would not require an exact 
replication of the offence but the offences must be similar in the broad sense. In 
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other words the essence of the offences must be similar.365 Therefore, offences 
may be categorised as offences related to ‘time, dishonesty, negligence and 
those related to unacceptable conduct in the workplace.’366 
 
The courts have drawn a distinction between collective and individual action and 
the relevance of prior warnings in this regard.367 This is especially the case in 
respect of time related offences and unprotected industrial action. Generally 
speaking, prior warnings for individual absenteeism are not relevant to 
subsequent collective absenteeism.368 Collective absenteeism usually occurs in 
the context of an unprotected strike or stay away. In SACTWU & another v Novel 
Spinners (Pty) Ltd,369 the court held that an employer should distinguish between 
individual and collective action when disciplining employees. The court held that 
there may be a number of other factors that compel employees to engage in 
collective action, besides their individual choice. In the case of individual 
absenteeism it is the employee’s choice to be absent whilst in the case of 
collective absenteeism employees may be compelled to engage in the collective 
action due to fear of victimisation, they may be bound by the decision of the 





Conduct on the part of the employee calculated to destroy the relationship of 
trust and confidence with the employer will justify dismissal.371 This can include 
conduct that reveals persistent defiance towards the employer and the failure to 
acknowledge responsibility and show remorse. Remorse does play some part in 
demonstrating an employee’s ability to mend his ways and remain a committed 
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employee. But it is generally of little relevance in cases of serious misconduct. 
Further, persistently denying any wrong doing and only becoming remorseful 
after an employee has been found guilty of misconduct is of little assistance to 
the employee as he should have acknowledged his wrongdoing upfront.372 In 
Theewaterskloof Municipality v SALGBC (Western Cape Division) & Others,373  a 
manager, through no fault of his own, erroneously received a monthly travel 
allowance and spent it. The court found that he had not been dishonest but 
rather defiant in refusing to repay the money back to the municipality. The court 
held that the municipality was entitled to expect a manager to act in its best 
interests and to seek to promote and safeguard its operational interests. Further, 
the municipality was entitled to expect him not to keep and use municipal funds 
which were paid to him in error and that he would expeditiously correct his 
conduct once he had ‘strayed’. The court held that he owed a duty to repay the 
money expeditiously and to ensure that the error was not repeated. Any 
grievances he may have had should have been addressed through the 
appropriate channels. The court held that it was not appropriate to defiantly 
refuse to refund over-payments received under the pretext of unresolved 
grievances. The court warned that: ‘An employee who embarks on recalcitrant or 
defiant conduct because of unresolved grievances does so at his or her own 
peril.’374 The dismissal was upheld by the LC. 
 
In Johannes v Polyoak (Pty) Ltd,375 the court stated the following in respect to an 
employee’s destructive conduct and lack of remorse: 
 
‘A striking feature of the case…is that …she refused to capitulate. As a 
senior shop steward of her union, she could have been under no 
misapprehension as to what her recalcitrance may hold in store for her…it 
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must have been clear to her that her lonely crusade was likely to end in 
the disaster of dismissal.’ 
 
In the case of Hulett Aluminum (Pty) Ltd v Bargaining Council for the Metal 
Industry & others,376 the court held that: 
 
‘It would in my view be unfair for this court to expect the applicant to take 
back the employee when she has persisted with her denials and has not 
shown any remorse. An acknowledgment of wrongdoing on the part of the 
employee would have gone a long way in indicating the potential and 
possibility of rehabilitation including an assurance that similar misconduct 
would not be repeated in future.’ 
 
In Consani Engineering (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & others,377 an employee was found 
guilty of being in unauthorised possession of a roll of scrap tape as he exited the 
security point. There was a strict rule against theft or unauthorised possession of 
company property and employees were required to first get permission before 
they removed company property. The employee pleaded guilty at the hearing 
and showed remorse, and he was the sole breadwinner. This did not save him as 
the LC overruled the CCMA and found that dismissal was the appropriate 
sanction. 
 
4.10 Mitigating and aggravating factors 
 
Once an employee has been found guilty of misconduct then the parties are at 
liberty to present factors in aggravation and mitigation of sanction. This is a 
separate enquiry where a variety of factors relevant to determining the 
appropriate sanction are considered. In respect of mitigating factors these would 
include length of service, disciplinary record, whether the employee owned up to 
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his transgression, remorse shown, the circumstances in which the infraction 
occurred and any other factors that reduce the employee’s blameworthiness.378 
An employer is not required to take factors into account that merely invoke 
sympathy. The test is whether the mitigating factors individually or in totality 
indicate that the employee can be rehabilitated and will not commit the offence 
again.379 Employees faced with misconduct can either elect to plead not guilty 
and hope that the employer has insufficient evidence to prove the commission of 
the offence, or plead guilty and hope for leniency on the part of the employer. 
However, employees who fail to show remorse do so at their own peril and 
cannot expect to re-establish trust with the employer especially in cases of 
serious misconduct. They in fact pose an operational risk to the enterprise. 
Accepting responsibility for ones wrongdoing is the first step towards 
rehabilitation.380   
 
In the Sidumo381 judgment the court did not specifically refer to mitigating and 
aggravating factors but rather used the terminology ‘relevant factors’. This needs 
to be considered against the backdrop of the majority decision in De Beers 
Consolidated Mines,382 where Conradie JA held as follows: 
  
‘Mitigation, as the term is understood in the criminal context, has no place 
in employment law. Dismissal is not an expression of moral outrage; much 
less is it an act of vengeance. It is, or should be, a sensible operational 
response to risk management in the particular enterprise.’   
 
However, a disciplinary enquiry does not end when an employee is found guilty 
of misconduct. Dismissal is not automatic, the Code requires more. Although the 
Code does not use the term mitigation, it requires the employer to consider 
besides the gravity of the offence, other factors such as the employee’s 
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circumstances, the nature of the job and the circumstances surrounding the 
infringement.383 Without considering these factors the fairness of the sanction 
cannot be ascertained. This would also include evidence being led as to the 
appropriateness or otherwise of the sanction to be imposed.384 Item 7(b)(iv) of 
the Code specifically requires an arbitrator to consider whether dismissal is an 
appropriate sanction. In Sidumo,385 the Constitutional Court stated that the 
commissioner must consider the reasons why the employer imposed the 
sanction of dismissal. The court stated the following: 
 
‘In approaching the dismissal dispute impartially a commissioner will take 
into account the totality of circumstances. He or she will necessarily take 
into account the importance of the rule that had been breached. The 
commissioner must of course consider the reason the employer imposed 
the sanction of dismissal, as he or she must take into account the basis of 
the employee’s challenge to the dismissal. 
 
There are other factors that require consideration. For example, the harm 
caused by the employee’s conduct, whether additional training and 
instruction may result in the employee not repeating the misconduct, the 
effect of dismissal on the employee and his or her long service record. 
This is not an exhaustive list.’386 
 
In NEHAWU obo Motsoagae,387 the commissioner stated that a commissioner 
cannot consider the reasons why an employer imposed the sanction of dismissal 
unless the person who actually took the decision is called to testify. This would 
also allow for the evidence (the decision) to be properly tested through the 
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process of cross examination and allow for the uncovering of any ill gotten or 
ulterior motives on the part of the employer.388 
 
However, when assessing the gravity of the offence this must be done in 
conjunction with an assessment of the employee’s personal circumstances, the 
nature of the job and the circumstances within which the misconduct occurred.389 
Further, due consideration must also be given to aggravating and mitigating 
factors. Aggravating factors may include the following:390 Willful and intentional 
conduct,391 lack of remorse shown, poor disciplinary record with current warnings 
that are still applicable, the employee has previously been made aware of the 
seriousness of the misconduct but persists with committing it and disgraceful and 
destructive conduct, such as racial comments and insults.392 
 
Mitigating factors may include the following:393 Clean disciplinary record, long  
service, the employee’s personal circumstances,394 the employee was remorseful 
and accepted responsibility for his or her conduct, the employee was coerced 
into committing the misconduct395 and the employee acted out of an 
apprehension for his or her safety.396 
 
Whilst an employer is enjoined to consider aggravating and mitigating factors, the 
nature of the job and the circumstances in which the misconduct occurred are 
more important factors then the employee’s personal circumstances.397   
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In Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & others,398 the LAC stated the following 
in respect to the relevance of mitigating factors in cases involving serious 
misconduct: 
 
‘Although a long period of service of an employee will usually be a 
mitigating factor where such employee is guilty of misconduct, the point 
must be made that there are certain acts of misconduct which are of such 
a serious nature that no length of service can save an employee who is 
guilty of them from dismissal. To my mind one such clear act of 
misconduct is gross dishonesty. It appears to me that the Commissioner 
did not appreciate this fundamental point.’ 399 
 
The court went on to find that the employee’s length of service was irrelevant in a 
case involving serious misconduct, such as gross dishonesty. The court stated 
that it should provide no mitigation. 
 
It is preferable for mitigating and aggravating factors to be presented after a 
finding of guilt. However, failure to do so does not amount to a material 
procedural defect to justify an award for compensation.400 Item 3(4) of the Code 
requires an employer to take personal and other circumstances into account but 
it is silent on whether this is a separate two stage enquiry or whether mitigating 
and aggravating factors can be dealt with in the merits of the case. Item 4 of the 
Code does not require an employer to hold a formal enquiry and considering that 
managers and supervisors are lay persons, a separate two stage enquiry is not 
pre-emptory.401 However, failure to consider mitigating factors at all will render a 
dismissal procedurally unfair.402 
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CHAPTER 5: DISPUTES ABOUT DISMISSAL 
 
5.1 When can employers impose a harsher penalty on appeal or deviate from the 
recommendations of the chairperson? 
 
Neither the LRA nor the Code makes it mandatory for employers to grant the 
employee the right to an internal appeal. Therefore the failure to afford an 
employee a right of appeal will not render a disciplinary process procedurally 
unfair unless the disciplinary code specifically makes provision for an internal 
appeal.403 If there is a right of appeal then it must be conducted fairly as the 
appeal is a separate part of the disciplinary process.404 
 
 If an appeals tribunal overrules a disciplinary finding in respect to guilt or 
reduces the sanction, higher levels of management cannot elect to rather 
implement the decision of the disciplinary enquiry as opposed to the appeal 
tribunal’s finding, no matter how inconceivable the appeal findings may be.405 
 
In Country Fair Foods v CCMA & others,406 the senior manager overruled the 
decision of the presiding officer and substituted a sanction of dismissal. For this 
reason the CCMA commissioner found the dismissal unfair. The LAC dismissed 
an application for review and was not satisfied with the company’s argument that 
they always dismissed for assault and that the presiding officer had been 
disciplined himself for failing to follow company policy. The court held that there 
was no provision in the disciplinary code for ‘review’ and because he acted 
‘without precedent’.407 The decision may have been different if the disciplinary 
code specifically provided for ‘review’.408 For State departments the position is 
somewhat different. Their disciplinary code empowers the presiding officer to 
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make a final decision, subject in most instances to a right of appeal. The Public 
Service Act, 1994 empowers Heads of Department with the authority to 
discharge officials ‘subject to the LRA’. They therefore have the power to 
intervene and overturn inappropriate or ‘shockingly inappropriate’ sanctions and 
this does not constitute a rehearing. The Public Service Act, 1994 supersedes 
the disciplinary code which is a collective agreement.409 Notwithstanding this, an 
employer reviewing a disciplinary outcome would be better placed to rather afford 
the employee a hearing.410    
 
It would appear that an appeal tribunal may also apply a harsher sanction then 
that imposed by the presiding officer, unless this is prohibited in terms of the 
employer’s disciplinary code.411 This is akin to the powers of the Appeal courts in 
criminal matters where they reconsider the merits of the matter should there be 
an appeal. There is no reason why this same principle should not apply in the 
employment context.412 However, in the employment context applying a harsher 
sanction when an employee appeals would seem to vitiate against the notion of 
fairness, which is an essential tenet of employment justice. The Labour Court has 
held that this is not permissible unless the employee has been for warned of the 
possible consequences of an appeal and the disciplinary code specifically 
provides for increased sanctions on appeal.413   
 
Once a presiding officer has made his decision and discharged his functions he 
becomes functus officio and cannot revisit his decision. In principle reviews of 
disciplinary outcomes by higher levels of management are unfair as management 
may not be aware of the facts of the case and they are the ones who appointed 
the presiding officer in the first place. They obviously had faith in the presiding 
officer’s capabilities. Heads of Department in the Public Service are empowered 
                                                 
409 Ibid 248; Dlamini v CCMA & others (2004) 25 ILJ 1060 (LC); PSA obo Venter v Laka NO & others (2005) 26 ILJ 
2390 (LC) 
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by legislation to do so but this is not the case for private sector employers.414 If 
the disciplinary code only empowers the presiding officer to make 
recommendations then higher levels of management would be entitled to impose 
a harsher sanction then that recommended by the presiding officer as long as 




During a disciplinary hearing an employer who alleges an employee committed 
an act of misconduct must prove so, on a balance of probabilities. The employer 
bears the overall onus in this regard. During the disciplinary hearing, the 
evidentiary burden will shift between the parties as the evidence is led. If the 
evidence is evenly balanced or indecisive the scale will tip against the party upon 
whom the onus rests.415  
 
In terms of section 192(1) of the LRA, in dismissal disputes, the onus rests on the 
employee to prove that he was dismissed, as opposed to resigned. Once this is 
established the onus then rests on the employer to prove that the dismissal was 
both procedurally and substantively fair.416 The burden of proof is that of a 
balance of probabilities as opposed to beyond a reasonable doubt, which applies 
to criminal matters. 
 
Therefore in unfair dismissal disputes the commissioner’s first task is to 
determine whether the employee was in fact dismissed. Thereafter a 
commissioner must establish whether the employee was in fact guilty of the 
offence for which he or she is alleged to have committed. If it is found that the 
employee is in fact guilty as charged then the commissioner’s second task is to 
enquire into the fairness of the sanction imposed. The employer bears the onus 
of proving that the employee was guilty of the offence on a balance of 
                                                 
414 Section 17(1) of the Public Service Act, 1994; J Grogan Dismissal (2010) 258  
415 J Grogan Workplace Law 10th ed (2009) 168; M Oelchig Evidence & Labour Law  (2005) 9-10 
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probabilities and that dismissal was a fair sanction under the circumstances. The 
employer must also prove that the trust relationship has irretrievably broken 
down due to the conduct of the employee in order to substantiate a sanction of 
dismissal.417 
 
The party who bears the onus should commence leading evidence in arbitration 
proceedings and must prove their case on a balance of probabilities.418 This 
remains so during the entire proceedings. For instance, an employer would need 
to show that in terms of all the admissible evidence produced by both parties that 
its version is more likely than that of the employee’s, at the conclusion of an 
unfair dismissal arbitration.419 However, the evidentiary burden will shift between 
the parties on issues during the arbitration proceedings. This means that the 
employee has a duty to rebut any prima facie case established by the employer 
to avoid an adverse finding.   
 
5.3 Disputes about dismissal 
 
Section 191 of the LRA deals with the procedure that needs to be followed in 
challenging alleged unfair dismissals. It provides that dismissal disputes must be 
referred to the CCMA or bargaining council within 30 days from the date of 
dismissal. If an employer has an internal appeal procedure then the date of 
dismissal will be run from the date on which the employer took the final decision 
to dismiss.420 An employee may only refer a dismissal dispute after he or she has 
been dismissed or given notice of dismissal.421 The CCMA or bargaining council 
may arbitrate a dispute if it remains unresolved (after conciliation) and falls within 
its jurisdiction and was also timeously referred. The CCMA or bargaining council 
must attempt to resolve the dispute within 30 days of referral, failing which the 
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commissioner must certify the dispute as unresolved by issuing a certificate to 
that effect.422 Conciliation is a consensus seeking process in which the 
commissioner attempts to assist the parties to settle the dispute themselves.423 If 
conciliation is unsuccessful an employee may refer the matter to arbitration or 
adjudication at the labour court depending on the true nature of the dispute.424 A 
dismissal dispute may be arbitrated if it relates to an employee’s conduct, 
capacity, is constructive in nature or the employee does not know the reason for 
the dismissal.425 An operational requirements dismissal involving one employee 
may also be referred to arbitration.426 All other dismissals are referred to the 
labour court unless the parties consent to arbitration.427 The true reason for the 
dismissal will determine the correct forum for referring the dispute, as opposed to 
the employee’s determination thereof.428 This prevents ‘forum shopping’. 
Dismissal disputes must be referred to arbitration or the labour court within 90 
days from certification of non resolution. Late referrals may be condoned on good 
cause.429 Arbitrations usually take place sometime after the failed conciliation 
unless the dispute resolution procedure is a ‘Con-arb’ where the arbitration  
happens immediately after conciliation.430 
 
Section 138 of the LRA states that commissioners must conduct the arbitration 
‘in a manner that the commissioner considers appropriate in order to determine 
the dispute fairly and quickly’ and that they need ‘to deal with the substantive 
merits of the dispute with the minimum of legal formalities’ The CCMA guidelines 
for misconduct arbitrations deals with the conduct of arbitration proceedings and 
assessing evidence, as well as determining the appropriate sanction for 
misconduct. 
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As regards process, a commissioner can choose between an adversarial 
approach (ie: where the commissioner intervenes only to clarify points or rule on 
procedure) or inquisitorial approach (ie: where the commissioner plays a more 
active role and descends into the arena by calling and questioning witnesses). 
 
An arbitration is not merely a review of the disciplinary proceedings but is a 
hearing de novo. However, in considering procedural fairness a commissioner’s 
role is basically to review the procedural steps followed during the disciplinary 
process to ensure that it was conducted fairly. In considering substantive fairness 
a commissioner’s role is to consider the evidence and make a determination as 
to whether or not an employee breached a workplace rule or standard and if so, 




Section 193 of the LRA contains remedies for employees that are unfairly 
dismissed. These include reinstatement or re-employment which can be 
backdated to the date of dismissal, or compensation.431 Reinstatement or re-
employment will not be awarded where the employee does not want to return to 
work, where it is clear that the employment relationship is intolerable, where it is 
not reasonably practical for the employer to reinstate or re-employee the 
employee or where the dismissal was only procedurally unfair.432 If a dismissal is 
only procedurally unfair then the award is limited to compensation that may not 
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5.4.1 When will reinstatement be ordered? 
 
Section 193(2) of the LRA states that re-instatement or re-employment must be 
ordered unless the employee does not want to return to work, or it is self evident 
that the working conditions between the parties have irretrievably broken down, 
or it is not reasonably practical for the employer to have the employee return to 
work or where the dismissal was found only to have been procedurally unfair. In 
respect to automatically unfair dismissals or dismissals for operational 
requirement the court may, in addition, make any order that it deems appropriate 
depending on the circumstances of the case.433 It is clear that reinstatement or 
re-employment is the primary remedy and compensation for unfair dismissals is 
the exception as opposed to the norm.434 The Labour Appeal Court in Kroukam v 
SA Airlink (Pty) Ltd,435 stated clearly that there are no choices in respect to 
ordering reinstatement or re-employment unless one of the exceptions exists. 
The court stated as follows: 
 
‘In this regard it is important to emphasise that the language of s 193(2) is 
such that, if none of the situations set out in paras (a) – (d), exists, the 
Labour Court, and, therefore, this court, or, an arbitrator, has no discretion 
whether or not to grant reinstatement. In the words of s 193(2) the Labour 
Court or the arbitrator ‘must require the employer to reinstate or re-employ 
the employee’ whose dismissal has been found to be unfair.’ 
 
In National Union of Mineworkers & Another v CCMA,436 the court dealt with a 
situation where a CCMA commissioner had awarded compensation to an 
employee who had been unfairly dismissed, as opposed to re-instatement as the 
employee had been perceived to be a bad person and the relationship between 
the employee and the union (the employer) was poor. The court found that the 
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reasons advanced for not reinstating the employee was not covered by section 
193(2) and therefore the award was not rational. The court stated the following: 
 
‘I have perused the record of the arbitration proceedings and could not 
find any evidence that proved that the exceptions contained in s 193(2) of 
the Act were met. The commissioner appears to have introduced a fifth 
requirement in considering whether reinstatement should or should not be 
ordered, namely that because the second applicant was perceived as a 
bad person and the relationship between the employee and the union was 
bad, he should not be reinstated… The commissioner should have found 
that none of the exceptions referred to in s 193(2) of the Act existed and 
should have reinstated the second applicant.’ 
 
It needs to be noted that most dismissals whether fair or unfair effect the 
employment relationship on both sides and to allow this to play a prominent role 
when considering re-instatement or re-employment would allow employers to 
abuse the exceptions and undermine the very purpose of section 193(2) of the 
LRA.437   
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
Some may say that there is nothing mystical about determining an appropriate 
sanction for misconduct, it is all about fairness. However, fairness is an elusive 
concept and it nevertheless plays an instrumental role in determining an 
appropriate sanction for misconduct. Fairness is not an absolute concept and 
reasonable people may readily disagree on what is fair or not, in particular 
circumstances. Our understanding of fairness is further informed by ones 
background, upbringing and culture. It is clear that our law has transformed from 
the common law position of lawfulness to the present position of fairness in so far 
as determining an appropriate sanction for misconduct is concerned. Historically, 
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a termination of employment had only to be lawful. The fairness of a termination 
was irrelevant and it could even be for an unfair reason or for ulterior motives.438 
Through judicial and legislative intervention fairness now forms part of our 
dismissal and misconduct dispensation.439 Terminations or dismissals now need 
to be both lawful and fair. The common law position still remains the same and is 
concerned with lawfulness although there is now an acceptance that there is an 
implied duty of fair dealing in a contract of employment. However, there is no 
implied duty of fairness in respect to terminating a contract of employment, 
unless the contract specifically provides for this. The requirement of a fair 
sanction for misconduct is a constitutional, legislative and judicial mandate. It is 
now codified in the LRA and was originally developed under the erstwhile LRA.440 
 
There is no precise answer to determine an appropriate sanction for misconduct 
and it would be unwise and impractical to have an exact formula for determining 
which types of misconducts call for which types of sanctions. Each case needs to 
be judged on its own merits with due regard to the parity principle. Added to the 
mix are the personal circumstances of the employee who transgressed, the 
nature of the job, the circumstances in which the misconduct occurred as well as 
other relevant factors that need to be taken into consideration.441 Employers are 
guided by the LRA, the Code as well as judicial precedent and other relevant 
policies and procedures. What is also clear is that the nature of the job and type 
of business enterprise will also dictate different type of sanctions for the same 
type of misconduct, depending on the operational risk the misconduct posed to 
that particular employer.442 The same may be said about different operational 
areas within the same workplace. For instance, smoking in hazardous areas will 
call for severe sanctions when compared to smoking in office areas or the 
employer may decide to treat both the misconducts as the same from a 
consistency point of view. However, it is clear that misconduct that poses an 
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operational risk to an employer normally justifies dismissal.443 It has been seen 
that no sympathy is granted to employees who commit acts of dishonesty and 
such acts generally warrant dismissal regardless of the value of the item stolen, 
the employee’s clean disciplinary record and length of services.444 The only 
concession granted is in the case of white lies or foolish conduct.445 It is also 
clear that actual evidence must be led that the employment relationship has 
irretrievably broken down. This cannot merely be inferred from the circumstances 
of the case.446 In respect of acts of negligence which are not intention based 
acts, sanctions can vary depending on the nature of the conduct, the prejudice or 
potential prejudice caused and whether the conduct amounts to gross 
negligence.  
 
The Code encourages the concept of corrective and progressive discipline and 
recognises that generally it is not appropriate to dismiss an employee for a first 
offence unless the misconduct is serious and of such gravity that it makes the 
continued employment relationship intolerable.447 As stated above, this forms 
part of risk management on the part of the employer. The legislative requirement 
of a fair reason for dismissing an employee and the imposition of a fair sanction 
ensures that the employer acts fairly when exercising his right to discipline his 
employees. The employer’s powers to discipline an employee are premised on 
the employment relationship itself. When employers implement sanctions they 
need to ensure that they are fair in doing so, as there are a number of  
tribunals448 ready to pronounce on the fairness or otherwise of the sanction 
imposed by the employer. These tribunals no longer consider the fairness of the 
sanction from the perspective of the reasonable employer, but from the 
perspective of the impartial commissioner with all the information placed before 
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him or her.  The commissioner does not start afresh and determine what a fair 
sanction is.  Rather, the commissioner utilising his or her own sense of fairness 
and by assessing all the information placed before him or her, makes such a 
determination. They obviously need to consider the reasons why the employer 
imposed a sanction of dismissal as well as why the employee claims it is unfair 
as well as all other relevant factors.449 Some may argue that when a 
commissioner is considering the fairness of a sanction with his or her own sense 
of fairness, he or she would need to determine afresh what the most appropriate 
sanction should be. The defining point is that the commissioner is not making the 
determination from a blank page but rather from all the relevant information 
placed before him or her. The record of the disciplinary process exists, the 
disciplinary proceedings have come and gone. In making a determination a 
commissioner must deal with the substantial merits of the matter with the 
minimum of legal formalities.450 However, the law of evidence still plays an 
important role. In determining a fair sanction for misconduct, and besides the 
severity of the misconduct, all relevant factors need to be taken into account. 
These factors would include, amongst others, the requirements of the employer’s 
disciplinary code, the employee’s disciplinary record, length of service, remorse 
shown, the personal circumstances of the employee, mitigating and aggravating 
factors, whether a lesser sanction would service the same purpose and whether 
the misconduct has breached the trust relationship. However, these factors need 
to be considered against the backdrop of the provisions of the LRA, relevant 
Codes and judicial precedent. These other relevant factors will carry little weight 
when it comes to acts of dishonesty as these misconducts generally render the 
employment relationship intolerable. If a commissioner finds that a dismissal is 
unfair then he or she is compelled to re-instate an employee unless one of the 
exceptions in section 193(2) of the LRA exists.  
   
From the case law discussed above the following can be highlighted: 
                                                 




The determination of a fair sanction is no longer the province of the employer. 
There is no longer deference to the employers’ choice of sanction, espoused by 
the reasonable employer test. The decision to dismiss belongs to the employer, 
but the determination of the fairness thereof belongs to the commissioner.451 
 
Commissioners are no longer constrained and limited to interfering with sanction 
only when it is manifestly or shockingly unfair. In this regard, commissioners 
could not interfere with sanction even if they thought another sanction would be 
more appropriate, unless it was patently unfair.   This has been found to be in 
contravention of our statutory dispute resolution procedures which provide 
impartial commissioners to resolve disputes.452 
 
Commissioners must show respect and appreciation for the employer’s decision 
with respect to the sanction, but they are not obliged to defer to the employer’s 
choice of sanction. They are required to determine the fairness of the dismissal 
as an impartial adjudicator. In Engen Petroleum,453 Zondo JP referred to the ‘own 
approach’ test which requires commissioners to make up their own minds as to 
whether or not the dismissal was fair. This is premised on the reasonable citizen 
test whereby a commissioner places himself or herself in the position of 
reasonable citizen and reaches the conclusions that he or she thinks a 
reasonable citizen would make, with all the relevant information placed before 
him or her. 
 
Commissioners can also not set aside the decision solely on the basis that they 
would have decided differently had they been in the employer’s shoes, all 
relevant factors need to be taken into consideration.454 
 




454 Sidumo v Rustenberg Platinum Mines Ltd (CC), supra 
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A value judgment is made when considering the fairness of a dismissal, taking all 
relevant circumstances into account. The commissioner must not determine 
afresh what the appropriate sanction is (ie: what he or she would do) but must 
determine whether the employer’s decision to dismiss is fair. This is the starting 
point of the enquiry. The commissioner must not substitute his or her personal 
views for that of the employer by deciding afresh what he or she would do in the 
position of the employer in respect to sanction. When making the value 
judgments commissioners must be mindful of simply importing their own value 
judgment.455 
 
The exercising of a value judgment is something that reasonable people may 
disagree over differ. However, this is not an unconstrained value judgment that is 
influenced by the background, views and perspective of the commissioner. 
Fairness requires that the interests of employees and employers must be taken 
into consideration. The question remains whether the dismissal, in all the 
circumstances, was a fair sanction. The decision must be reasonable and the 
commissioner is compelled to apply his or her mind to the issues in respect to the 
case.456 
 
Commissioners are ultimately required to weigh up and consider the reasons 
provided by the employer to justify the dismissal with the reasons advanced by 
the employee for challenging it. This is not altered by the fact that arbitrations are 
hearings de novo.457 
 
In approaching a dismissal dispute impartially, a commissioner is required to take 
into account the totality of circumstances, this would include the importance of 
the rule, the reason the employer imposed the sanction of dismissal and the 





basis of the employee’s challenge to the dismissal. This is not a closed list and 
all relevant factors need to be taken into consideration.458 
 
In dismissal arbitration the process is two fold. Firstly, the commissioner must 
establish whether the employee is in fact guilty of misconduct. This is based on 
the rules of evidence and no value judgment is made. Secondly, if the employee 
is found to be guilty the commissioner must identify and weigh up relevant factors 
to determine the appropriateness of sanction. These include the facts of the 
case, statutory and policy framework and judicial precedents. 
 
If the relationship of trust has been breached this is not the end of the matter. All 
relevant factors must be weighed up together in light of the seriousness of the 
breach. However, acts of misconduct such as dishonesty go to the heart of the 
employment relationship and normally justify dismissal. 
 
The absence of dishonesty goes a long way in favour of promoting the 
application of progressive discipline rather than dismissal. Failure to take 
responsibility for actions and denials count against an employee.459 
 
Whether a dismissal will be regarded as fair will depend on whether the 
misconduct alone has rendered the continued employment relationship 
intolerable or cumulatively with past transgressions it has done so. 
 
An employee’s clean record and length of service must be weighed up against 
the severity of the offence when considering the fairness of the sanction. 
 
The Sidumo460 judgment has limited the reviewing courts ability to interfere with 
arbitration awards regardless of whether they adopt a strict or lenient approach. 
The decisions of different commissioners may lead to different approaches. This 





is something that will have to be lived with regardless of the uncertainty it 
creates. The task of determining the fairness of a dismissal lies with 
commissioners.461 
 
In order to prove that the employment relationship has irretrievably broken down, 
it is established that the employer must lead the evidence of a manager or 
supervisor of the employee in this regard.462 
 
At the end of the day, determining an appropriate sanction for misconduct is 
about common sense and fairness, after considering all the relevant information. 
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